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Preface 
 
This report presents the results from a research project undertaken by 
the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs during 2009–2010, 
with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Results 
from the project have been presented to the ministry at various stages 
and this report presents an edited collection of the various outputs, in-
cluding some new material. Hence the report is not a monograph and 
the chapters can generally be read separately. In the summary, a brief 
overview of the report is also provided. 
 At NUPI, Arne Melchior has been the main responsible and 
project manager, with Åshild Johnsen as Research Assistant during 
the autumn of 2009. Christopher Stevens, Overseas Development In-
stitute, London, has written Chapter 3 and we thank him for his con-
tribution. Åshild Johnsen contributed to Chapter 2 where she is in-
cluded as a co-author, and the remaining parts were written by Arne 
Melchior. 
 In December 2009, Johnsen and Melchior visited Geneva and 
had meetings with various developing country representatives as well 
as staff members from the WTO and UNCTAD. We thank those who 
spent time sharing with us their valuable knowledge and views. We 
also thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the financial support, for 
practical assistance in Geneva and for their comments to material pre-
sented from the project earlier. As usual, the responsibility for remain-
ing errors remains with the authors, and the views and assessments are 
those of the authors and not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
  
  
Arne Melchior 
Senior Research Fellow and Project Manager, NUPI 
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Abstract of policy conclusions 
 
Based on Chapter 2 and the report in general 
 
While non-discrimination across trade partners is a core principle in the inter-
national trading system, exceptions are allowed in some cases (e.g. free trade 
agreements). For trade in goods, it has also been allowed since 1971 to give 
better market access to developing countries in order to promote development.  
In the current negotiation round of the WTO (World Trade Organisation), it 
has been suggested to introduce similar discrimination for trade in services. A 
waiver (temporary exemption) from WTO rules may allow discrimination to 
the favour of the Least Developed Countries. This report examines the implica-
tions. 
Services can be traded across borders or via FDI or temporary move-
ment of the service providers. In this report, we therefore undertake a study of 
global service trade flows of all types in order to assess the impact of prefer-
ences.  
 While developing countries are now net exporters of manufactured 
goods, developed countries have a comparative advantage for services, in the 
form of cross-border trade as well as FDI. In spite of India’s success in infor-
mation technology services, the export performance of developing countries is 
generally weaker for services than for goods. The dominance of developed 
countries is particularly large for skill-based services. LDCs are marginal ser-
vices suppliers in most areas. 
 Norway has relatively large services trade due to shipping and imports 
of business services from Europe, but trade with developing countries is rela-
tively small due to Norway’s proximity to and integration with Europe. Regis-
tered services imports or FDI from the LDCs into Norway are close to zero. 
 Due to the limited services trade with LDCs, the assessment of the re-
port is that better market access for LDCs in Norway will have modest eco-
nomic impact. A possible exception is Mode 4 trade, which may be increased 
especially if access for less-skilled service providers from LDCs is allowed.  
 Due to the limited impact of preferential market access for LDCs, Spe-
cial and Differential Treatment (SDT) should not rely too much on such dis-
crimination, but include other approaches such as trade-related aid. FDI in the 
tourism sector of LDCs may also help, but this cannot be stimulated by market 
access in Norway.  
 Since Norway is a marginal export market for the exports of services 
from LDCs, the economic impact of a waiver will largely depend in its imple-
mentation in large nations such as the USA, or the EU. In the report, we show 
how the EU has granted better market access to Caribbean countries in one of 
its recent trade agreements. 
 Trade preferences for services are technically more complex than for 
goods and the actual future implementation of a waiver is uncertain. The over-
all impact of a waiver is therefore difficult to assess in advance, and a waiver 
should be considered as a temporary experiment in order to develop new ways 
of promoting development through services trade. 
Arne Melchior  
 
8 
 
Abstract, Chapter 3: 
 
The potential role of services trade preferences in fostering 
export diversification in low income states  
 
Preferences for services trade in the WTO represent a new concept where 
the practices as well as the consequences are little known. Such practices 
in regional and bilateral agreements on services may therefore provide 
useful knowledge about how to shape preferences, and their conse-
quences. Chapter 3 therefore examines the recently concluded 
CARIFORUM-EU EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement), which is 
the only EPA with a fully developed services agreement. 
  
 Due to their extreme export specialisation, many of the Least Devel-
oped Countries (LDCs) have been particularly vulnerable to fluctua-
tions in international markets and the global financial crisis. This has 
earlier been well known for LDC commodity exporters, but it has re-
cently become clear that vulnerability also applies to services export-
ers. Some LDCs rely heavily on tourism, which has been hard hit by 
the crisis. Services trade preferences for LDCs could promote diver-
sification and thereby reduce their vulnerability. 
 Trade preferences for services are only effective where trade is im-
peded by government regulations rather than business practices. Fur-
thermore, qualification or accountability requirements are often mo-
tivated by non-trade concerns and therefore not subject to interna-
tional negotiations or suitable for discrimination across countries. For 
such reasons, services trade preferences should be more case-specific 
than for goods, and focus on cases where it is likely that such gov-
ernment measures will generate more exports.  
 The services chapters of the CARIFORUM EPA cover 13 non-LDC 
states. Compared to LDCs, these countries are one step up the ladder 
and therefore represent a “best case” in terms of services trade poten-
tial. The agreement contains specific “positive lists” for each 
CARIFORUM country with increased market access for specific sec-
tors and modes in services, in addition to some “horizontal” offers 
that apply to all countries. Commitments also vary across EU mem-
bers so the agreement is complex with 13x27 schedules. 
 For GATS Mode 4, the CARIFORUM EPA mainly provides liberali-
sation for skilled labour, and the EU has opened 29 sub-sectors for 
temporary visits of “contractual services suppliers”. There are no 
quotas or ceilings, but individual EU countries may apply economic 
needs tests. 
 While the economic impact of services preferences is somewhat un-
certain and difficult to quantify in advance, such preferences may be 
a useful supplement to other measures. If such preferences also pro-
vide help to conclude the Doha Development Agenda, this would 
have an additional value which should not be underestimated. 
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Abstract, Chapter 4 
 
Development and comparative advantage in services 
 
Since the purpose of services trade preferences is to promote develop-
ment and reduce poverty, it is important to know how services trade is 
related to development. Trade in services takes place according to the 
four supply modes defined by the WTO, and the analysis therefore ad-
dresses FDI and temporary migration as well as ordinary services trade. 
 
 According to WTO data, international trade in goods and services 
have grown at the same pace during 1990-2008. International FDI 
has grown almost twice as fast during the same period. Cross-border 
trade (Mode 1 of the GATS) and commercial presence (Mode 3, in-
cluding FDI) are the most important modes of supply. 
 Rich countries have larger services sectors and are on average net ex-
porters of services as well as net suppliers of FDI. While developing 
countries have developed a significant trade surplus for trade in 
goods, they are on average net importers of services as well as FDI. 
For migration, net flows go in the opposite direction: from poor to 
rich countries. For services, there is a lot of two-way trade between 
rich countries. 
 During 1990-2007, lower middle income countries had continuous 
growth in their income levels and their share of world trade, and their 
trade in goods grew faster than trade in services. The Least Devel-
oped countries experienced growth during 2000-2007, and their 
goods trade and services imports increased considerably. While their 
exports of goods grew fast, their services exports lagged behind. 
Probably due to aid, LDCs have relatively high services imports. 
 At the more disaggregated level, there are considerable differences 
across services sectors: Rich countries tend to be net exporters of 
skill-based services; developing countries do better for passenger 
travel and tourism; and construction and freight are intermediate 
cases. The ranking across sectors is mostly similar for LDCs and 
other developing countries. The notable exception is computer and 
related services, where India’s export success has boosted developing 
country performance. This is however still the exception rather than 
the rule. For LDCs, tourism is the most important services activity. 
 Developed nations have 80% of outward and 2/3 of inward FDI. 
LDCs have a significant share of inward FDI but almost no outward 
FDI. About 2/3 of world FDI is in services, with financial services 
and business services as the leading sectors. 
 Temporary movement (Mode 4 trade) has also increased but current 
data availability is very limited. Such trade is estimated to represent 
1-2% of total services trade but the figure is uncertain. Mode 4 trade 
is much more restricted than Modes 1-3 and with a more liberal re-
gime, such trade could increase. 
Arne Melchior  
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Abstract, Chapter 5 
 
Norway’s services trade and the potential impact of trade pref-
erences 
 
If the scope for trade preferences for services is increased, current trade pat-
terns may indicate where such preferences may be successfully applied if they 
are to be effective. The analysis below shows that Norway’s trade pattern 
partly conforms to the global patterns shown in Chapter 4. But due to the 
proximity and integration with Europe, Norway’s services trade with develop-
ing countries is more limited than for the world at large.  
 
 Norway has traditionally had large services trade, with shipping exports as 
a driving force. In spite of the rising importance of the oil and gas sector, 
services trade is still important, with a share of GDP that is higher than 
for the Euro area. 
 Norway is currently a large net exporter of maritime services and other 
transport and communication services, and a significant net importer of 
travel services. The USA is a significant market for shipping and 29% of 
services exports go to North America. For services imports, 80% comes 
from Europe. 
 Norway’s imports of services from developing countries is very limited, 
and large countries such as China, India and Brazil have much lower 
shares in Norway’s imports of services than for goods. According to the 
data available, Norway recently did not import services from LDCs. 
Some imports of tourism may however be unregistered.  
 At 50%, the share of services in FDI is somewhat lower for Norway than 
for the world, due to FDI related to oil and gas. Almost all inward FDI 
was from OECD or Offshore Financial Centres, while 15% of outward 
FDI was directed to developing countries. There was virtually no inward 
FDI from LDCs, and the outward FDI to LDCs was mainly related to oil. 
 We have no data on Mode 4 services trade, but since current Mode 4 trade 
is linked to FDI, the FDI evidence indirectly shed light on Mode 4 as 
well. In addition, we use migration data to illustrate the geographical dis-
tribution of migrants. A large share of immigration into Norway is from 
developing countries, and 14% of the inward migrant stock was from the 
LDCs. 
 Since Norway’s registered services imports from LDCs are close to or 
equal to zero according to the analysis, the short-term material impact of 
preferential market access for LDCs in Norway is likely to be limited. For 
Mode 4, there may be scope for an increase if market access is improved 
for less skilled workers. This is however a politically controversial issue 
and the impact will depend on the measures taken. In order to help the 
LDCs develop their services sectors, the analysis suggests that aid and in-
vestment will be more important than market access discrimination. 
Hence a wider perspective on SDT (Special and Differential Treatment) is 
needed. 
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Abstract, Chapter 6 
 
International Migration, the Least Developed Countries 
and the WTO 
 
The chapter provides a survey with some new evidence on aspects of in-
ternational migration. While Mode 4 trade constitutes a very small share 
of international migration, this broader evidence sheds light on some as-
pects that are also relevant in the GATS context. 
 
 International migration, especially South-to-North migration of 
skilled labour has increased rapidly in recent decades and migrants 
now constitute 9% of the population in the OECD. 44% of interna-
tional migration is South-South. The poorest countries have lower 
emigration rates and for the LDCs, 61% of outward migration is to 
low-income countries. International migration and Mode 4 in the 
GATS are therefore not North-South issues but global issues. 
 Emigration of skilled labour contributes to a “brain drain” but in 
some cases, the prospect of emigration can lead to more investment 
in education and the net result may be a “brain gain”. This is more 
likely for large countries such as India, but for poor countries with 
limited skills the brain drain can be a real problem. In spite of this, 
some LDCs consider skilled emigration as a future prospect. For 
temporary migration, the brain drain problem is more modest. 
 According to current practice, GATS covers foreign individuals and 
foreign firms delivering services, but not foreigners employed by 
host country firms. There is however some ambiguity in the GATS 
legal text and a future option is to allow the latter category and 
thereby recruitment of temporary workers by host country firms. If 
the LDCs are granted new special provisions in the GATS, one op-
tion is to extend the scope of GATS in this way only for the LDCs, in 
addition to providing more or deeper commitments. 
 Temporary migration may easily become permanent and current re-
gimes for temporary migration in the OECD are generally based on 
strict implementation regimes. These are in several cases based on 
bilateral cooperation where source countries also have responsibility 
for screening, return and control. Mode 4 liberalisation without ap-
propriate control regimes is likely to be an illusion, and a waiver 
should therefore extend flexibilities on implementation and allow bi-
lateral arrangements. 
 

1. The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and 
the issue of SDT in services: Background 
and overview of the report 
 
Arne Melchior 
 
The chapter briefly presents the trade policy context of the issues ex-
amined in the report, and the content of later chapters. 
 
1.1. Introduction: The DDA and services 
 
The establishment of GATS (the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices) from 1995 was one of then main achievements of the Uruguay 
round of the WTO (the World Trade Organisation). GATS secured a 
new legal framework for services trade and linked it to the common 
dispute settlement system; and it provided a framework for future lib-
eralisation. In terms of actual liberalisation, the Uruguay Round was 
less impressive, and most analysis suggests that what was done was 
more to put on paper the status quo rather than to provide real im-
provements in market access (for an analysis of current commitments, 
see e.g. Adlung and Roy (2005)). Recently, Gootiiz and Mattoo 
(2009) have presented new evidence that compares GATS commit-
ments with current actual market access. According to their analysis; 
if actual market access is set equal to 1, current commitments are on 
average at 2.3. For trade in goods, it is well known that WTO tariff 
ceilings are often far above the currently applied tariffs (so-called 
“water in the tariffs” in the WTO jargon), and there is apparently a 
similar slack in the GATS.  
 Will the “commitment slack” be removed through the DDA? 
Services negotiations in the DDA have moved slowly and been partly 
in the shadow of the negotiations on agriculture and goods trade (the 
so-called NAMA – Non-Agricultural Market Access negotiations) 
(see e.g. Adlung 2009). According to Mattoo (2005) “The negotiation 
process has resulted in a low-level equilibrium trap where little is ex-
pected and less offered”. Some progress has been made since then. 
The more recent assessment of Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009) is that the 
DDA liberalisation prospects can be quantified at 1.9, compared to the 
figures above.  
 A general pattern in the GATS is that developing countries 
have accepted less “commitments” than developed countries. Coun-
tries in Asia and the Middle East have the most restrictive current 
trade policies for services (ibid.); especially for cross-border trade 
(Mode 1) and commercial presence (Mode 3). For services delivered 
Arne Melchior  
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through temporary migration, or “movement of natural persons” as it 
is called in the WTO, most country groups are restrictive. 
 The asymmetry between developed and developing countries 
is partly a feature of the WTO rules; developing countries and particu-
larly the LDCs are expected to liberalise less.  If trade is good for de-
velopment, this rule is paradoxical but it is nevertheless one of the 
“advantages” of developing countries in the WTO as well as the 
GATS. In the DDA, negotiations have developed on how SDT may be 
developed further. 
 
1.2. New proposals for preferential trade policies  
 
For trade in goods, preferential trade policies for development pur-
poses have been pursued ever since the 1960s, and “Special and Dif-
ferential Treatment” (SDT) of developing countries has become an 
accepted policy objective in the WTO. In the current WTO negotia-
tions (the Doha Round or Doha Development Agenda – DDA), SDT 
is one of the major buzzwords, and one proposal is that preferences 
for trade in services should be strengthened.  
 For trade in goods, SDT has been provided in four different 
shapes: 
 
- Non-reciprocity in negotiations; whereby developing countries are 
allowed to liberalise less that rich countries.  
- Technical assistance; whereby poorer WTO members are given 
aid-for-trade (AfT) in order to promote trade, enhance their nego-
tiating capacity or strengthen institutions. 
- Transitional arrangements; whereby developing countries are 
given longer time to phase in trade reforms.  
- Preferential market access; especially in the form of the GSP 
(Generalised System of Preferences) that was established the late 
1960s and allowed rich countries to have lower tariffs on imports 
from developing countries. 
 
For trade in goods, all these four types of SDT have been granted and 
accepted and this is reflected in the GATT Agreement. In the case of 
services, however, there is no agreement on preferential market access 
and only the first three types have been provided. 
In the field of goods, GATT/WTO negotiations have aimed at 
sweeping tariff cuts applying to many sectors. For example, the DDA 
negotiations for manufactured goods aim at cuts according to a for-
mula that would apply equally to all manufacturing sectors. For ser-
vices, however, market access negotiations are undertaken in a step-
wise manner based on requests and offers for particular services sec-
tors and particular modes of supply. In the context of GATS, a fifth 
type of SDT has therefore been added: 
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- Preferential coverage: In this case, liberalisation for each sec-
tor/mode of supply is undertaken without discrimination, but the 
selection of sectors and modes is made in a way that favours de-
veloping countries. 
 
For trade in goods, preferential coverage has not been important as a 
principle. On the contrary, preferential market access has been partly 
nullified by adverse selection of sectors. For example, the GSP sys-
tems of rich countries have been more limited for textile goods which 
have frequently been considered as “sensitive” and exempted from 
tariff reduction. Hence for sectors of particular interest to developing 
countries, market access has not been better, but on the contrary more 
limited.  
The GATS Agreement refers to non-reciprocity and preferen-
tial coverage as well as technical assistance. Article IV paragraph 2 
stipulates that increased participation by developing countries in world 
services trade should be promoted by (i) strengthening their services 
capacity and competitiveness through e.g. access to technology on a 
commercial basis; (ii) improved access to information and distribution 
channels (which may include technical assistance); and (iii) liberalisa-
tion in sectors and modes of supply of particular interest to developing 
countries (i.e. what we have called preferential coverage). Developed 
countries should establish “contact points” to improve the developing 
countries’ access to information (IV.2) (also implying technical assis-
tance). With respect to both paragraphs, special priority should be 
given to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and for the LDCs the 
principle of non-reciprocity is also stated (IV.3).  
The implementation of GATS Article IV has however not been 
fully clear, and this is therefore an issue in the Doha Round. In 2003, a 
set of guidelines (“Modalities”) were agreed upon regarding how the 
promised favourable treatment for LDCs should be addressed in nego-
tiations.1 Non-reciprocity, preferential coverage and technical assis-
tance are again the main approaches. In 2005, the European Commu-
nities issued its own statement on LDC preferences in services where 
these three principles were endorsed. In this context, the EU explicitly 
rejected the option of preferential market access: “… quotas for LDCs 
would appear to contradict the principle of MFN treatment enshrined 
in the GATS”.2 In 2006, however, the LDCs tabled their own DDA 
proposal on how to implement Paragraph IV.3 in GATS, including 
preferential market access.3  Some countries including Norway have 
shown sympathy for this idea, but the Doha Round, in particular the 
services negotiations, have moved slowly so no agreement has been 
established.  
                                                 
1  See WTO document TNS/S/13 of 5 September 2003, included in Appendix C. 
2  WTO document TN/S/W/54 of 3 October 2005. MFN = Most Favoured Nation. 
3  WTO document TN/S/W/59 of 28 March 2006, included in Appendix B. 
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If preferential market access is to be granted to LDCs, it will 
be contrary to the MFN principle of WTO, and a legal mechanism for 
this purpose therefore has to be established. For trade in goods, GSP 
was initially allowed under a temporary exemption from the MFN 
principle (a “waiver”), and later under the so-called “enabling clause”; 
a GATT decision from 1979.4 In the DDA negotiations, a waiver has 
been proposed and it now seems likely that it will be part of the final 
result. When Director-General Pascal Lamy of the WTO presented the 
road map for further DDA negotiations on 24 July 2009, he stated 
“The implementation of LDC modalities has always been an impor-
tant topic in the services negotiations and consultations are continuing 
on an anticipated submission regarding an LDC Waiver mechanism.”5 
A waiver related to services is one of the elements that may contribute 
to a completion of the DDA, and therefore has significance beyond the 
direct economic effects that may follow from the waiver itself. Given 
that a waiver is about to be decided, we examine in this report the po-
tential impact and implementation.  
 
1.3. Trade preferences for goods vs. services 
 
The proposal for a waiver for LDCs in the GATS could be seen as a 
parallel to the early history of preferences for trade in goods:  When 
the GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) was initiated, it implied 
a violation of the MFN (Most Favoured Nation) principle of the 
GATT, and a special legal exemption was needed. In May 1971, 
therefore, the GATT Council decided that “the provisions of Article I 
shall be waived for a period of ten years” in order to grant tariff pref-
erences in favour of developing countries (GATT 1972, p. 24ff.).  
 The waiver proposed for the LDCs in GATS is legally a paral-
lel to the GSP waiver in 1971 but there are some differences: The 
GATT waiver in 1971, as well as the GSP system later, was for devel-
oping countries in general while the GATS proposal is only for LDCs. 
While Special and Differential Treatment exists in the GATS also for 
other developing countries, the rights under a waiver may not. 
Preferential treatment is technically easier for goods tariffs 
since the MFN barrier is a simple figure: If the MFN tariff is 25%, the 
GSP tariff can be 10% or zero. Rich countries have also bound most 
of their tariffs whereas for services, GATS commitments have been 
made only for a fraction of the sectors and modes. Preferences may 
then be granted by adding new commitments, and one possible inter-
pretation of a waiver is that more commitments may be given to 
LDCs.  This creates a risk that preferences in services may contribute 
to a very complex trade system.  
                                                 
4  “Differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation of devel-
oping countries”, GATT Decision of 28 November 1979, document L/4903, p. 202ff in 
GATT (1980).  
5  See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/tnc_dg_stat_24jul09_e.htm.  
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If a commitment has been made on an MFN basis, LDCs may 
be granted a more far-reaching commitment. In some cases this would 
be clear: For example, if there is an immigration quota, an additional 
quota could be granted to LDCs, or additional occupations could be 
added. But e.g. for regulatory issues, it would not always make sense 
with “deeper commitments”. For example, if a specific education is 
required for accountants, it would not be plausible to drop this re-
quirement for LDCs. Regulatory barriers play a larger role for ser-
vices; especially for skill-based services where licensing and qualifi-
cation requirements are the main barriers. In most cases, SDT in the 
form of less stringent qualification requirements is not an option that 
makes sense.  
 
1.4. Overview of the report 
 
The analysis of services trade preferences is more complex since ser-
vices trade can occur in different ways, according to the four GATS 
modes of supply (cross-border trade, consumption abroad, commercial 
presence and temporary movement of service providers). To the extent 
that time and statistics allow, the report examines all the four modes: 
 
- Modes 1 and 2 are in principle included in the available statistics 
on services trade; although it is likely that Mode 2 trade is under-
reported. For example, registered services imports from LDCs into 
Norway are negligible but there may be Mode 2 trade in tourism 
that is not reflected in the statistics. 
- For Mode 3,  FDI data capture most of the trade and are also 
available for services. 
- For Mode 4, there is a severe data gap and we have to use round-
about ways to address the issues. In current WTO practice, market 
access has been granted particularly for FDI-related movement of 
service providers and FDI evidence therefore also tell something 
about Mode 4 trade, or at least a component of it. The migration 
literature and evidence also addresses issues relevant to Mode 4, 
and we therefore also use migration data to shed light on general 
issues related to Mode 4. In this context, it should therefore be re-
called that Mode 4 trade is just a tiny sub-component of migration.  
 
Chapters 4-6 contain empirical analysis of international services trade 
(Chapter 4), Norway’s services trade (Chapter 5) and aspects of inter-
national migration (Chapter 6). To some extent, and particularly in 
Chapter 6, we also include a survey of relevant literature.  
Preferences for services trade in the WTO represent a new 
concept where the practices as well as the consequences are little 
known. Such practices in regional and bilateral agreements on services 
may therefore provide useful knowledge about how to shape prefer-
Arne Melchior  
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ences, and their consequences. Chapter 3 therefore examines the re-
cently concluded CARIFORUM-EU EPA (Economic Partnership 
Agreement), which is the only EPA with a fully developed services 
agreement.  
Each of these four chapters includes an own abstract, and they 
constitute a basis for the overall policy assessment included in Chapter 
2. Chapter 2 draws on the analysis undertaken later and also summa-
rises particularly relevant aspects. 
The Appendix of the report includes supplementary material for the 
different Chapters. Appendix A contains additional statistical tables 
related to Chapters 4 and 5. Appendix B contains core WTO docu-
ments on SDT in the current GATS negotiations. Appendix C includes 
fact sheets for aggregate services trade as well as 14 sub-sectors, as a 
supplement to Chapter 4. 
2. Special and differential treatment in  
services: An overview and assessment 
 
Arne Melchior and Åshild Johnsen 
 
2.1. Introduction 
1. Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for developing countries 
has been implemented for trade in goods since the 1960s. This is 
reflected in the outcome of GATT negotiations as well as the GSP 
(Generalised System of Preferences). For services, some forms of 
SDT exist in the current GATS Agreement. In the ongoing WTO 
negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), developing 
countries have asked for extended SDT and guarantees for its im-
plementation. A waiver (temporary exemption) has been proposed 
that allows discriminatory market access in favour of the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). 
2. LDCs are weak suppliers in many services sectors and one could 
easily think of forms of SDT that have little effect beyond their 
symbolic content. For example: financial services are skill-
intensive; FDI is a major mode of “trade”; and the LDCs are not 
significant export suppliers. Providing SDT in the form of prefer-
ential market access for LDCs in financial services, FDI would 
therefore be of modest value. As a principle, SDT should be pro-
vided in a way that is feasible, credible and possible to exploit. 
SDT as mere “symbolic policies” with little real effect amounts to 
tampering with the global trade system; even with a risk of harm-
ing it. A characteristic feature of services trade is that liberalisa-
tion has to a limited extent been discriminatory, as has been the 
case for trade in goods. Introducing more discrimination for ser-
vices also has a cost in terms of discrimination and complexity, 
and this cost should be borne only when the gains from such 
measures are even larger. 
3. The question of more development-friendly trade rules for services 
is one of the issues that have to be solved in order to obtain a suc-
cessful conclusion of the current WTO negotiation round; the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA). If a waiver for services can 
contribute to concluding the DDA, it will therefore have a devel-
opment impact far beyond its own field.  
4. Services sectors are extremely heterogeneous in several respects: 
skill levels, modes of trade and linkages to other sectors. In order 
to provide SDT in a way that is efficient in terms of promoting de-
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velopment, one has to consider this heterogeneity (cf. the financial 
sector example) and the particular characteristics of the main sec-
tors and modes. In the study, we therefore undertake an examina-
tion of trade flows, specialisation and modes of supply at the ag-
gregate and partly at the sector level. Since market access dis-
crimination has not yet been allowed at the multilateral level, we 
also look at regional trade agreements in order to draw on the ex-
perience from these agreements, for example with respect to the 
technical implementation of discriminatory policies. 
2.2. Comparative advantage and trade in services 
5. Services can be delivered via cross-border trade (GATS Mode 1), 
consumption abroad (Mode 2), commercial presence (Mode 3) and 
temporary movement of service providers (Mode 4). The analysis 
of development and comparative advantage has to cover all 
modes, and we generally do so even if the data availability for 
Mode 2 and in particular Mode 4 is limited. For this purpose the 
analysis relies on a number of data sources: We mainly use data 
from the IMF Balance of Payments (BOP) statistics (for services 
trade, covering Modes 1 and 2); UN statistics on services trade 
(for bilateral trade flows); UNCTAD statistics on FDI (Mode 3); 
supplemented with the World Development Indicators (variables 
on country characteristics). For Mode 4 we do not have appropri-
ate data but some indirect evidence can be obtained from interna-
tional migration data, and various databases for international mi-
gration are therefore used in Chapter 6. For the study of Norway’s 
services trade, we also supplement with national statistics on ser-
vices trade and FDI. 
6. In the analysis of trade flows and FDI, we split the world into five 
country groups: EU, other high-income (HIGH), upper middle in-
come (UM), other low and lower middle income (LLM) and LDC. 
While our main focus is on the LDC group, we also consider 
whether SDT should discriminate between LDC and LLM. LDC 
contains 800 million people (12% of the world population in 2008) 
and LLM 3.8 billion (57%). In terms of population, LLM is five 
times larger than LDC, and in terms of economics it is nominally 
about 20 times larger (with variation across variables to be consid-
ered).  
7. SDT is for developing countries and even if special forms are 
granted to LDC only, one has to consider the questions of effi-
ciency and equity: the LDC income average is well below LLM, 
but the latter group also contains many poor countries as well as a 
large proportion of the world’s poor. Based on poverty data avail-
able in the World Development Indicators for 2005 or later, we 
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find that there were 202 million poor (below 1.25$ a day) in LDC 
but 766 million in LLM (456 of these are in India). In many sec-
tors, LDCs are weak suppliers and preferences could have greater 
trade-promoting impact if they were given to countries one step up 
the ladder. For such reasons, Norway has recently extended her 
GSP for goods to low-income countries beyond the LDCs. Given 
that the dividing line is not sharp and its location to some extent 
arbitrary, an issue is whether provisions for LDCs, at least in the 
longer run, should be extended to LLM or parts of it. Alterna-
tively, one could think of such measures as special treatment for 
the very poorest that are eliminated as they become richer.   
8. The LDC group experienced significant economic growth since 
the mid-1990s, with its share of world GDP increasing from 0.64 
to 0.82% (nominally) or from 1.07 to 1.39% (PPP-adjusted). Ex-
ports of goods (mainly resource- and labour-intensive) grew faster 
than GDP from 1998 onwards, while exports of services lagged 
somewhat behind. The LDCs have a particularly high share of 
world imports of services (see Chapter 4); probably driven by aid 
money. For example, the LDC share of world imports of construc-
tion services grew to a high 6% in 2007 (see fact sheets in Appen-
dix C).  
9. The fast recent growth of LLM including China and India is well 
known and continued the last decade after a slight downturn due 
the Asian crisis. Also for LLM, goods exports were the “leader” 
but services exports also expanded. LLM services exports were hit 
more heavily by the Asian crisis and the LLM share of the world 
total for services exports is currently somewhat lower than for 
GDP or goods exports. The statistics used here do not include the 
recent financial crisis and its adverse impact on trade, especially in 
2009. 
10. For aggregate services exports (Modes 1 and 2), developing coun-
tries are net importers, and developed countries are net exporters. 
The trade deficit in services is relatively small for LLM and rela-
tively large for LDC. Contrary to this, developing countries now 
have a surplus for trade in goods. In order to exploit comparative 
advantage in the DDA, developed countries should also liberalise 
goods, and developing countries should also liberalise services.  
11. A large share of world services exports is in Mode 3 and this trade 
is not shown in the services trade statistics. For example, almost 
all trade in distribution services (trade) is via FDI and this signifi-
cant part of services exports is not shown in trade data. Financial 
services (including insurance) and distribution have traditionally 
been sectors where FDI is of major importance, and in recent years 
Arne Melchior and Åshild Johnsen 
 
22 
the role of FDI has increased also for other sectors such as other 
business services, transports and communication. About 2/3 of the 
world FDI stock in 2007 was in services, and Mode 3 is a major 
form of services trade. Estimates vary somewhat but suggest that 
around half of world services trade is in Mode 3. According to 
UNCTAD (2004), estimates based on foreign affiliate sales indi-
cate that approximately 2/3 of world services trade was FDI-
driven by the turn of the century. FDI is even more dominated by 
rich countries than services trade; with net outflows to developing 
countries but also large two-way flows between rich countries. 
The LDC share of outward FDI is extremely low; confirming a 
low share for LDC in FDI- or affiliate-driven services sales. For 
inward FDI, however, the LDC share is considerably higher. 
12. Analysis of comparative advantage at the sector level reveals that 
developing countries generally have a low share of exports of 
skill-based services such as financial services; insurance; com-
puter and information services; personal, cultural and recreational 
services (including audiovisual services); and other business ser-
vices.  At the other end of the scale we find travel and passenger 
transports, for which developing countries including the LDC 
group have stronger export performance. For many LDCs, tourism 
has been a successful activity and a major foreign exchange 
earner. A particular feature of tourism in some LDCs is that it is 
not a narrow and sharply delineated sector, but has linkages to a 
number of other services sectors such as transportation, hotels and 
restaurants etc. For tourism, a lot of foreign trade is in Mode 2 but 
FDI may also play a core role for related sectors. The quality of 
roads and infrastructure is also important.  
13. Compared to LDCs, the ranking of sector export shares is to a 
large extent similar for LLM; but with a notable exception: The 
top ranked sector is computer and information services, with an 
LLM share at 23% of world exports. This is mostly (or 87%, to be 
exact) driven by India’s success in this sector; where India is the 
world’s largest exporter. Exports of computer services are there-
fore not generally spread out among the LLMs; it is as yet an ex-
ception. The general pattern is more similar to the LDCs but one 
step higher in terms of world export shares and performance. 
Travel, communication and transports are also in this case in the 
top of the ranking, and the bottom sectors are the same as for LDC 
(finance, insurance, personal services, other business services). 
LLM had a share of inward FDI larger than its share of world 
nominal GDP (12 against 10% in 2005), but China absorbed about 
2/3 of this so again it did not apply generally to the LLM group. 
For the group as a whole, performance was weaker in the high-
tech or FDI-driven services sectors. 
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14. The analysis of comparative advantage shows that with some ex-
ceptions, LDCs are marginal suppliers in international services 
trade. Other developing countries are also net importers in most 
service sectors, but have a stronger supply capacity. If preferential 
market access for services is extended beyond LDCs, the eco-
nomic impact could be larger.  
2.3. Norway’s services trade 
15. Norway’s services trade is generally in line with the global pat-
tern, but with some modifications. Norway has relatively large 
services trade (Modes 1- 2) due to shipping exports and imports of 
various business services from Europe. Due to the proximity to 
and integration with Europe, however, the share of developing 
countries in Norway’s services trade is lower than in world trade. 
This pattern is repeated for FDI, where inward FDI is mainly from 
the OECD and Offshore Financial Centres. 15% of outward FDI is 
in developing countries.  
16. According to the available services trade and FDI data, Norway’s 
registered imports of services from LDCs are at zero. This limits 
the potential impact of preferential market access and suggests that 
SDT in services has to include other approaches as well. There 
may however be imports of tourism from LDCs that are not cap-
tured by current statistics. 
2.4. Services trade: Modes of trade, and regulation 
17. The analysis above has already shown that poor countries have a 
particular profile with respect to modes of services trade: They had 
lower shares for FDI-driven services trade (Mode 3), high shares 
for some sectors dominated by consumption abroad (Mode 2, 
travel and partly passenger transports), and a mixed pattern for 
cross-border trade (Mode 1). Mode 4 (temporary migration) con-
stitutes a very small fraction of world services trade (1-2% accord-
ing to some estimates). Modes of trade are however affected by 
technological developments as well as barriers to trade, and one 
argument related to Mode 4 is that it is small precisely because it 
is generally not allowed. Trade is also affected by technological 
change: The outsourcing of computer and business services to In-
dia is made possible by better information and communication 
technologies. The ICT revolution generally reduces the need for 
physical proximity in production and consumption processes, as il-
lustrated by electronic trading and exchange of information.  
18. For a number of services sectors, explicit “prohibitions” or barriers 
to trade are not the main barriers but international trade can be se-
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verely limited by differences in regulation. Financial services, in-
surance and professional business services are examples of sectors 
where licensing, qualification requirements and other regulations 
play a major role and where international liberalisation is techni-
cally demanding. Two countries may for legitimate reasons have 
different regulations, and this difference may reduce trade even if 
there was no explicit intention to do so. The experience from the 
European internal market shows that the process of reconciling 
different services regulations is difficult, even among the like-
minded. For the WTO, it is generally unrealistic to pursue har-
monisation on its own, but in some cases the matter can be facili-
tated if strong international standardisation organisations exist in 
the particular area in question. In that case, the WTO can agree to 
adhere to the international standards. This principle has also been 
successfully implemented for trade in goods, where e.g. Codex 
Alimentarius standards for food are de facto implemented in some 
cases.  In the GATS, work on regulation is important in several 
sectors. An example is accounting services. If regulatory differ-
ences constitute the main trade barrier, it goes without saying that 
preferential market access may be difficult to implement: should 
accountants from LDCs be allowed to have less education? 
19. Due to the complexity of regulation in some types of services, 
poor countries are sometimes at a disadvantage due to the weak-
ness of their institutional capacity. It is difficult to measure the av-
erage complexity, restrictiveness or quality of a country’s regula-
tory regime. The World Bank’s “ease of doing business” index has 
recently become available for many countries. This indicator is 
strongly correlated with income, so doing business is inherently 
more difficult in the poorer countries. This is an indication that the 
regulatory environment in poor countries limits trade in services 
sectors that rely more on regulation. This may contribute to ex-
plaining why finance and business services are on average weak 
performers in LDC as well as in LLM countries. 
2.5. Temporary movement of services providers 
20. Mode 4 liberalisation is currently limited in GATS and one of the 
difficult issues of the current negotiations. Mode 4 commitments 
in GATS have mainly been related to FDI and to skilled labour; by 
allowing business visitors, professionals and intra-company trans-
ferees. Developing countries have suggested that Mode 4 com-
mitments are de-linked from FDI and extended to less skilled la-
bour categories. Given the political controversies about migration, 
developed countries have so far been reluctant. According to some 
observers, progress on the issue is critical for the overall balance 
of the DDA negotiations (see e.g. Gootiiz and Mattoo 2009). 
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21. Mode 4 trade constitutes a very small share of international migra-
tion, but evidence on international migration nevertheless sheds 
useful light also on some aspects of Mode 4. International migra-
tion, especially South-to-North migration of skilled labour has in-
creased rapidly in recent decades and migrants now constitute 9% 
of the population in the OECD. In spite of this, almost half of in-
ternational migration is still South-South. Also for Mode 4 move-
ments, it is likely that local migration between developing coun-
tries will remain an important element. All trade has a “gravity 
factor” with a strong role for geographical proximity, and for a 
construction firm in Bangladesh, work in Kolkata is in most cases 
likely to be more relevant than missions to Norway.  
22. While South-North migration is driven by income gaps, the emi-
gration rates are not highest when the income gap is largest but at 
intermediate levels: The poorest countries have lower emigration 
rates than the second poorest and for the LDCs, a large share of 
outward migration is to low-income countries. So even for Mode 4 
trade, the implication may again be that the supply capacity of 
LDCs is more limited than for countries one step up the ladder. 
23. Emigration of skilled labour contributes to a “brain drain” but in 
some cases, the prospect of emigration can lead to more invest-
ment in education and the net result may be a “brain gain”. This is 
more likely for large countries such as India, but for poor countries 
with limited skills the brain drain can be a real problem. The state-
of-the-art conclusion is that brain drain is a problem for small and 
poor countries if the emigration rate for skilled labour is too high. 
This is relevant in the Mode 4 context even if temporariness partly 
eliminates the risk. For this reason, it might sometimes be useful 
to consider Mode 4 movement as an element in the human capital 
development of poor countries rather than as an end in itself. Some 
LDCs consider skilled emigration as a future prospect and are not 
worried about the brain drain. For temporary migration, concerns 
for brain drain are less serious. 
2.6. Discrimination in services: experience from regional 
trade agreements 
24. In the literature on services, a general argument has been that lib-
eralisation has only to a limited extent been discriminatory. There 
are various reasons for this: A major reason which is frequently 
forgotten is that the OECD contributed to services liberalisation 
among rich countries from the 1980s6 and by 1995, this liberalisa-
                                                 
6  Through the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations, see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3343,en_2649_34887_1826559_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
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tion had advanced quite far. Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
between rich countries have, even when services were included, 
not proceeded too far beyond the OECD regime. A reason is that 
further liberalisation is difficult since regulatory issues may be dif-
ficult to handle. An example is the financial liberalisation in the 
EU internal market, which is still far from complete in spite of se-
rious efforts to this effect over two decades.  
25. During the last decade, regional trade integration has however ex-
panded strongly beyond OECD countries, and this creates a 
greater scope for discrimination in services trade. A number of 
new RTAs covering services have been negotiated, and an exami-
nation of these shows that they go far beyond GATS, by including 
more sectors and new liberalisation commitments (see e.g. 
Marchetti and Roy 2008). Some countries even liberalised “sensi-
tive” sectors such as education or audiovisual services, for which 
liberalisation in the GATS is difficult to achieve. Hence one ex-
perience from PTAs is that they make it possible to agree also in 
difficult areas which are notoriously challenging in the WTO con-
text with its 153 members. 
26. According to the literature, another reason why services liberalisa-
tion is not strongly discriminatory has been liberal rules of origin 
(RO). Rules of origin define the country of origin for goods or 
services and thereby determine whether they are entitled to lower 
tariffs or other trade preferences. For trade in goods, the ROs de-
fine what kind of physical transformation or value increase or 
change of product classification that is necessary if a product is to 
be considered as originating from a certain country. In the field of 
services, other types of rules are needed: since services are non-
tangible, the rules have to relate to the service provider rather than 
the product. The major distinction is then whether the RO is based 
on (i) location or (ii) ownership or control. If location is sufficient, 
the RO is liberal and a trade preference may be exploited by estab-
lishing an affiliate in the country in question. For example, some 
PTAs use the criterion of “substantive business operations” and 
then foreign-owned companies may also benefit from preferences. 
At the other end we find e.g. the Thailand-Australia PTA, where 
Thailand only grants preferences to companies that are “owned 
and controlled by Australian persons” (Fink 2008). The “substan-
tive business operations” rule is actually written into GATS 
(jointly with the requirement of being a judicial person of the 
country, in Article V:6 of the GATS) and this may explain why 
many PTAs have liberal ROs that limit their discriminatory im-
pact. This applies to Modes 1 and 3; for Mode 4 the matter is less 
complicated since persons are not “multinational” like companies. 
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For Mode 4, nationality – and in the GATS also permanent resi-
dency – is the main RO criterion. 
27. On the whole, the recent wave of PTAs covering services adds lib-
eralisation and some more discrimination to the world trade sys-
tem for services. The extent of discrimination is however still lim-
ited due to previous OECD liberalisation as well as liberal ROs in 
most cases.  
28. Chapter 3 in this report illustrates forms of providing services 
preferences for developing countries. EU liberalisation in the 
CARIFORUM EPA agreement is mainly for skilled labour, but il-
lustrates that there is a menu of options for gradual liberalisation. 
Interpreted as a supplement to other measures, such trade prefer-
ences can be beneficial even if their economic impact for the very 
poorest countries turns out to be limited. 
29. For Mode 4, discrimination is possible and since liberalisation is 
very limited in the GATS as well as the OECD, new PTAs could 
in principle add a new dimension to the issue. Some PTAs include 
Mode 4 liberalisation beyond the GATS: Examples of agreements 
such as these are provided by Chanda (2009), who investigates 
temporary cross-border movement of less-skilled service providers 
in two specific bilateral agreements (Spain-Ecuador and Canada-
Mexico, respectively). These agreements exemplify possible ways 
of managing temporary migration that ensures temporariness and 
mutual benefit for both parties. These agreements establish quotas 
for migrant workers ands specify the number of admitted workers; 
their categories of workers, scope of work and other conditions re-
lated to employers and workers. Temporariness is defined in de-
tail, including provisions on possible renewal and extension. The 
agreements also cover wages and working conditions for the mi-
grants, and give preferences to local workers to ensure local sup-
port. Administrative mechanisms for recruitment and entry are es-
tablished and defined. An important feature of these agreements is 
flexibility in design and implementation, in the sense that the 
agreements are adjusted to local labour markets and conditions. 
The enforcement of the contracts is ensured through incentives 
(possible for the workers to return if they comply with regulation) 
and disincentives (not returning withheld wages and other sanc-
tions). Support for the agreements is ensured through a broad-
based stakeholder participation in designing the framework. Im-
portantly, enforcing the agreements depends upon good coordina-
tion and cooperation between departments, ministries and agencies 
involved both within and across the countries. Furthermore, regu-
lation and mechanisms protecting the workers’ rights and interests 
are necessary in both host and source country. Finally, the agree-
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ments must cohere to national laws on migration, taxation and 
other regulations. In the case of Norway, the recently adopted im-
migration act includes a “carve-out” for international treaties and 
also includes special provisions for temporary or seasonal migra-
tion.  
2.7. SDT in services: A menu of options 
30. How could LDC development be promoted by means of SDT or 
other measures related to services trade? SDT can be provided in 
different forms. In the analysis, we distinguish between (i) non-
reciprocity in negotiations – whereby LDCs or developing coun-
tries are expected to make fewer market access commitments; (ii) 
aid for trade (AfT) which has been an important part of the DDA 
agenda; (iii) longer transition periods for implementing liberalisa-
tion, which have been used in earlier WTO rounds and may be 
used again; (iv) preferential market access which is still not al-
lowed for services but proposals are on the table; and (v) preferen-
tial coverage, whereby MFN liberalisation is undertaken particu-
larly for services that are exported from LDCs or other developing 
countries. One might even add (vi) general aid to education, infra-
structure or other purposes that are particularly relevant in the con-
text of services. In DDA there is disagreement about (iv) but the 
other forms of SDT are generally accepted (although (vi) would 
generally be outside the realm of WTO negotiations).  
2.7.1. Non-reciprocity and transition periods 
31. Non-reciprocity in negotiations applies to goods as well as ser-
vices and can be measured by the extent of market access com-
mitments made by rich and poor countries, respectively. Analysis 
of the Uruguay Round outcome confirms that developing countries 
made fewer commitments and this is in conformity with the non-
reciprocity principle. In a setting where WTO proponents teach the 
virtues of free trade as a lever for development it is indeed a para-
dox that favourable treatment is implemented as the right to have 
less trade. This outcome however corresponds to the mercantilist 
logic of WTO negotiations: increasing your own openness is bad, 
but market access abroad is good.  Luckily, this thinking is res-
cued by the new trade theory which generally tells that trade is 
good but liberalisation should be two-way: in the presence of scale 
economies and imperfect competition, an element of mercantilism 
makes sense. This applies to the pure model of trade with scale 
economies, and the result can be modified if concerns for technol-
ogy transfer are added: If technology is transferred via trade, the 
gains from protection are reduced or eliminated.  For services, 
mercantilist thinking is further weakened due to the strong input-
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output effects for infrastructure services such as transportation, 
communication, finance, insurance and trade. Efficiency in these 
sectors spills over to the rest of the economy since they are inputs 
in production as well as consumption activities. For example, the 
expected gains from the EU internal market were particularly 
strong for services, due to the indirect impact on other sectors. For 
the LDCs and LLMs, an implication is that GATS liberalisation is 
relevant not only for the top-ranked sectors where their exports are 
relatively large, but also for the less competitive sectors at the bot-
tom of the graph, which matter greatly for the overall performance 
of their economies. If liberalisation through GATS can improve 
their performance, it has a value beyond the mercantilist calculus. 
32. Whereas the arguments above weaken the case for non-reciprocity 
in services, other aspects work in the opposite direction: Liberali-
sation is not always appropriate for services and this is linked to 
development. For example, it is widely acknowledged that finan-
cial liberalisation should not be undertaken unless a country has an 
appropriate regulatory regime in place, and poorer countries have 
greater difficulties in this respect. Liberalising banks should not be 
exchanged for exports of T-shirts; financial liberalisation has a 
systemic impact which is different. Liberalisation is in principle a 
good thing, but not at all times, and not without preconditions. 
Non-reciprocity may be used in order to take into account such 
regulatory concerns, and make sure that poor countries are not 
pressurised into premature liberalisation. It is legitimate to con-
sider the sequencing and wait if necessary. Non-reciprocity should 
however not be exaggerated to the extent that too many WTO 
countries become B-members with blanket exemptions from main 
policy decisions. In the longer run, this will certainly undermine 
the WTO.    
33. Transition periods were used extensively in the Uruguay Round 
but a criticism has been that such measures were temporary and 
had the main purpose of sweetening pills that developing countries 
were not really prepared to swallow. In order to avoid such a feel-
ing of deceit, it is important that transitional arrangements are 
given an appropriate motivation in terms of alleviating structural 
transformation or safeguarding the need for gradual reforms. Tran-
sition periods make sense in this light: For example, countries may 
need to develop regulations and standards parallel to liberalisation 
and should have time for that (cf. the example of financial ser-
vices). If liberalisation is expected to lead to substantial job losses 
in particular sectors, this is also a legitimate reason for transition 
periods, and such periods could then be supplemented with AfT 
for relevant purposes.  
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2.7.2. Preferential coverage: Sectors and modes 
34. In the GATS, the principle we have called “preferential coverage” 
has been established as a form of SDT: Even if market access dis-
crimination between suppliers continues to be prohibited, MFN 
liberalisation could be undertaken especially for sectors and modes 
of particular importance to developing countries. Is this feasible or 
an illusion?  
35. With respect to sectors of particular interest to poor countries, the 
experience from goods trade suggests that preferential coverage 
will not be easy to obtain. For trade in goods, one had de facto the 
reverse phenomenon: GSP tariff reductions as well as MFN tariff 
cuts in rich countries were frequently more limited for the so-
called “sensitive sectors” – which happened to be sectors of par-
ticular interest to developing countries (e.g. textiles, agriculture 
and fish in the EU). For services, the situation is different since 
some of the most simple and labour-intensive services can never 
be traded unless we allow migration: Haircuts cannot be done 
online. It also seems that some sectors for which the developing 
countries perform above average, are among the less protected. 
For example, tourism is considered to have a more liberal trade re-
gime; maybe because consumption abroad is something that few 
countries aim to restrict. In most services sectors, rich countries 
currently have a large share of world exports (see fact sheets), and 
it would not make sense to halt liberalisation in order to maintain 
preferential coverage. In terms of sector focus, it therefore seems 
that the principle of preferential coverage is of limited value. 
36. The most serious issue in terms of “preferential coverage” is there-
fore about modes rather than sectors, and about Mode 4 in particu-
lar: Liberalisation in Mode 4 is more limited and the developing 
countries are pushing for liberalisation. Allowing for temporary 
migration could make it possible for more advanced developing 
countries to exploit wage differentials for skilled labour, and it 
would allow all developing countries to undertake low-skill ser-
vices production in selected areas. In Europe, for example, there is 
considerable temporary migration for seasonal work in agriculture, 
and these workers could be replaced by migrants from Sudan or 
other countries in LDC and LLM, where there are 4.6 billion peo-
ple to recruit from. In principle, such migration could lead to eco-
nomic gains to exporting as well as importing countries, and in-
creased remittances. On the other hand, there might be substantial 
implementation problems related to illegal migration, and for 
skilled labour the brain drain issue would be present if migration 
becomes permanent or recurrent. We will revert to these issues in 
the later analysis.  
Services and Development: The Scope for Special and Differential Treatment in the GATS  
 
31
37. For the other modes, services exports from FDI-driven or skill-
based sectors are dominated by rich countries, but developing 
countries gradually increase their interest in the field. As noted, 
Mode 2 is considered as fairly liberalised. In Mode 1 there are bar-
riers in activities related to tourism; e.g.  air transports are partly 
exempted from GATS and this limits the development of tourism 
in some poor countries.  
2.7.3. Discriminatory market access: A new waiver? 
38. In the GATS, all liberalisation so far had to be non-discriminatory, 
i.e. on an MFN (Most Favoured Nation) basis. Along with the ini-
tial approach for trade in goods, a waiver is now being proposed 
that will allow explicit discrimination to the favour of LDC coun-
tries. The proposal only encompasses the LDCs, and not develop-
ing countries in general. It is not clear whether this should be con-
sidered as a temporary approach (extension to LLM may be sug-
gested later, and LDC may be the door opener), or a permanent so-
lution. The LDCs themselves would probably suggest the latter but 
other developing countries might wish to obtain such preferential 
treatment later. 
39. Discriminatory market access is possible for Mode 4: If quotas for 
temporary migration of less skilled labour from LDC are estab-
lished, increased trade will be the result. In the WTO it is gener-
ally acknowledged that liberalisation in Mode 4 is a politically 
sensitive issue so the expectation is hardly massive liberalisation 
but some steps that gradually open this door. 
40. Trade policy discrimination is easy in the case of tariffs for goods, 
where the rate may be set lower for developing countries. For ser-
vices, this is more complicated and for some sectors and modes, 
discriminatory market access may be a non-feasible approach. For 
example: Discriminatory market access in tourism is mainly non-
feasible; rich countries cannot limit travel to non-LDC countries. 
In some cases, regulation constitutes the main barrier and dis-
criminatory regulation generally makes little sense: banks from 
LDCs should not have lower capital adequacy requirements.  
41. The study of comparative advantage in services generally confirms 
the weak supply capacity of LDCs. Discriminatory market access 
for Modes 1, 2 and 3 will therefore have limited economic impact. 
In some cases, it may also be questionable from a perspective of 
equity or efficiency: Should FDI commitments be granted only to 
those who cannot exploit them? Some possibilities nevertheless 
exist and a waiver could be used as an experiment to find possible 
ways of implementation. SDT should however not rely too much 
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on discriminatory market access, but be combined with aid, in-
vestment and other efforts to promote the development of the ser-
vices sectors of the LDCs. If preferential market access is granted 
to LLM countries as well, the argument of limited supply capacity 
is invalidated and such policies could have a stronger impact. 
2.7.4. Mode 4 market access for LDCs: Some further issues 
42. According to current practice, GATS covers foreign individuals 
and foreign firms delivering services, but not foreigners employed 
by host country services firms. There is however some ambiguity 
in the GATS legal text and a future option is to allow the latter 
category and thereby recruitment of temporary workers by host 
country firms. If the LDCs are granted new special provisions in 
the GATS, one option is to extend the scope of GATS in this way 
only for the LDCs, in addition to providing more or deeper com-
mitments. 
43. Temporary migration may easily become permanent and current 
regimes for temporary migration in the OECD are generally based 
on strict implementation regimes. As noted above, these are in 
several cases based on bilateral cooperation where source coun-
tries also have responsibility for screening, return and control. 
Mode 4 liberalisation without appropriate control regimes is likely 
to be an illusion, and a waiver could therefore extend flexibilities 
on implementation and allow bilateral arrangements.  
44. A major distinction is whether Mode 4 market access should also 
be given for less skilled labour categories. Mode 4 commitments 
in GATS may either be horizontal (across sectors), or defined in 
terms of specific professions and level of skills. The Uruguay 
Round was meant to cover mainly two categories of natural per-
sons: (i) intra-company transferees, “essential personnel” (man-
agement, professionals, skilled staff), and (ii) business visitors 
with short-term presence, but generally not employed by the host 
country (see e.g. Karmakar 2008). Extending Mode 4 is one of the 
main demands of LDCs. In the GATS negotiations, they have fo-
cused on four categories: (i) independent professionals, (ii) busi-
ness visitors, (iii) contractual service suppliers and (iv) others. The 
most controversial request concerns the fourth category, which in-
cludes unskilled labour. The EU responded in 2005 that their offer 
would not be extended to non-professional (i.e. low-skill) service 
suppliers, arguing that most low-skilled service providers do not 
provide services under contract or on a fees basis in the way in-
tended by Mode 4. In this understanding, “lower skilled workers 
generally provide their services by direct recruitment on the em-
ployment market”, to which the GATS does not apply. The EU 
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was however willing to commit on some of the categories of ser-
vice suppliers not linked to commercial presence (contractual ser-
vice suppliers; independent professionals; graduate trainees). 
2.8. Trade-related aid for services development  
45. Alternative to discriminatory trade measures, development of the 
LDC services sectors could also be promoted by aid. AfT has be-
come more important during the DDA negotiations and an increas-
ing share of AfT (currently above ¼) is directed towards the 
LDCs. Some AfT is provided by the WTO and specialised agen-
cies such as IF (the Integrated Framework), but the major share is 
given bilaterally or through multilateral institutions. The World 
Bank has worked to “mainstream” trade policies and AfT into the 
poverty reduction strategies of poor countries. Some AfT is spe-
cifically related to export promotion and trade capacity building; 
so-called trade-related technical assistance and capacity building, 
whose share of total aid has increased.7  
46. Such “narrow” forms of AfT may also be provided for services but 
our view is that in general, the LDC problems with slower growth 
in services exports are deeply rooted. These are development prob-
lems that cannot easily be solved by means of export promotion or 
other trade-specific remedies. Providing export promotion assis-
tance to LDC banks will not help too much: it may be better to 
provide aid for education, financial regulation or institution build-
ing. The tourism industry in LDCs can be supported with narrow 
AfT but it depends on infrastructure and development in a much 
broader sense. Such broader aid is beyond the scope of the WTO 
but may be of great importance, especially for the poorest coun-
tries.  
47. It is likely that some of the “consumption abroad” in LDCs as well 
as their imports of services are driven by aid and this shows that 
aid probably has a significant influence on the services sectors of 
LDCs. AfT for tourism may indirectly increase the Mode 2 ex-
ports of services from LDCs further, and other options could be 
considered (such as health stays).  
2.9. Concluding comments 
48. On the whole, the analysis suggests that discriminatory market ac-
cess for LDCs may play some role, but a limited one due to the 
weak supply capacity of LDCs. This is particularly clear in the 
                                                 
7  For an overview of AfT up to 2006, see Melchior, A., 2007, Aid for Trade and the Post-
Washington Confusion, NUPI Working Paper No. 715, available on www.nupi.no.   
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case of Norway, where current registered services imports or in-
ward FDI from LDCs are zero or close to zero.  If Mode 4 market 
access is extended to less skilled labour categories, the scope for 
trade seems greater. This raises a number of implementation and 
control issues but methods exist for solving them if the political 
willingness is present.  
49.  Due to the limited potential impact of market access discrimina-
tion for LDCs, SDT in services should not rely mainly on such 
policies but include other measures such as trade-related aid.  
For other developing countries, trade policy discrimination could have 
a greater economic impact. The scope for such policies is nevertheless 
more technically limited than for goods tariffs: for qualification and 
accountability requirements in services, discrimination across trade 
partners rarely makes sense. 
 3. The potential role of services trade pref-
erences in fostering export diversification 
in low income states  
 
Christopher Stevens* 
 
Abstract  
 
Preferences for services trade in the WTO represent a new concept 
where the practices as well as the consequences are little known. Such 
practices in regional and bilateral agreements on services may there-
fore provide useful knowledge about how to shape preferences, and 
their consequences. This Chapter therefore examines the recently con-
cluded CARIFORUM-EU EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement), 
which is the only EPA with a fully developed services agreement.  
 
 Due to their extreme export specialisation, many of the Least De-
veloped Countries (LDCs) are particularly vulnerable to fluctua-
tions in international markets and the global financial crisis. This 
has earlier been well known for LDC commodity exporters, but it 
has recently become clear that vulnerability also applies to ser-
vices exporters. Some LDCs rely heavily on tourism, which has 
been hard hit by the crisis. Services trade preferences for LDCs 
could promote diversification and thereby reduce their vulnerabil-
ity. 
 Trade preferences for services are only effective where trade is 
impeded by government regulations rather than business practices. 
Furthermore, qualification or accountability requirements are of-
ten motivated by non-trade concerns and therefore not subject to 
international negotiations or suitable for discrimination across 
countries. For such reasons, services trade preferences should be 
more case-specific than for goods, and focus on cases where it is 
likely that such government measures will generate more exports  
 The services chapters of the CARIFORUM EPA cover 13 non-
LDC states. Compared to LDCs, these countries are one step up 
the ladder and therefore represent a “best case” in terms of ser-
vices trade potential. The agreement contains specific “positive 
lists” for each CARIFORUM country with increased market ac-
cess for specific sectors and modes in services, in addition to 
some “horizontal” offers that apply across to all countries. Com-
mitments also vary across EU members so the agreement is com-
plex with 13x27 schedules. 
                                                 
*  Dr. Christopher Stevens is currently a Senior Research Associate at the ODI, London, 
where he was formerly Director of International Economic Programmes. 
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 For GATS Mode 4, the CARIFORUM EPA mainly provides lib-
eralisation for skilled labour, and the EU has opened 29 sub-
sectors for temporary visits of “contractual services suppliers”. 
There are no quotas or ceilings, but individual EU countries may 
apply economic needs tests. 
 While the economic impact of services preferences is somewhat 
uncertain and difficult to quantify in advance, such preferences 
may be a useful supplement to other measures. If such preferences 
also provide help to conclude the Doha Development Agenda, this 
would have an additional value that should not be underestimated. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Trade preferences as a development instrument have a long and con-
troversial history. The combination of two events – the impasse in the 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) – has made a reconsideration timely. The former has exposed 
painfully the difficulty of agreeing new trade rules in a body with the 
WTO’s membership and modus operandi whilst the latter has had an 
impact even on countries with a minimal share in world trade and ex-
posed their structural weaknesses.  Could innovative new preferences 
appropriate to the state of global trade policy in 2010 deal with both of 
these: revitalise the DDA and make LDCs and other poor countries 
less vulnerable? This is a valid question even for those who consider 
universality in trade rules to be the ideal and for whom, therefore, dif-
ferentiation of any kind (including preferences) is a second-best op-
tion or worse.   
This paper provides three sets of information to contribute to 
an answer. First, it uses the lens of the GFC to highlight the structural 
trade weaknesses of many poor countries, and the role that services 
trade could play in their mitigation. Second, it analyses the potential 
for North-South preferences on services trade and the features that 
would be required in any such regime to make it commercially useful. 
Third, it examines the recently agreed EU-CARIFORUM Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) to see how far it contains such features. 
It has been written to complement Melchior and Johnsen (2009).** 
3.1.1. The lens of the GFC 
 
Trade is a key transmission mechanism of the global financial crisis 
(GFC) for least developed countries (LDCs), as it links them to mar-
kets that are heavily affected by the financial crisis via changed terms 
of trade and export demand. This is more the case for LDCs than for 
other developing countries as they are relatively more dependent on 
                                                 
**  This refers to a preliminary version of Chapter 2 in this report.  
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trade and on external flows (remittances, foreign direct investment) in 
general. Moreover their exports tend to be more concentrated than 
those of other developing countries. This combination of factors 
makes LDCs more exposed to the vagaries of external markets (Calì 
and Kennan, 2009a). 
The full impact of the GFC on LDCs (and on small vulnerable 
economies (SVEs)) has not yet been felt, but Calì and Kennan have 
forecast GDP cuts of 4% or more for many (2009 a and b). They point 
out that both groups are characterised by small market size and high 
transport costs. Their small domestic markets mean that most of the 
firms are small and medium enterprises with limited opportunities for 
reaping the benefits of economies of scale and investing in research 
and development. Furthermore, in the case of LDCs, most lack skilled 
labour or adequate human capital which limits access to external capi-
tal and constrains industrial development. All these factors contribute 
to high unit production costs which put them at a relative disadvantage 
in international trade in goods.   
As a result, these countries tend to have a less diversified pro-
duction structure, with most exports concentrated in a few sectors, and 
a large number of products and services acquired from abroad. For 
most LDCs and SVEs the combined share of the first and second most 
valuable export products is over 50% of total exports. 
So services offer a tempting opportunity to break out from this 
vicious circle because they are less dependent than goods on transport 
costs and involve lower levels of scale economies. But the mirror of 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) shows that this goal has not yet 
been fully achieved. Whilst services exports as a whole appear to have 
been more resilient to the GFC than have goods, tourism and transport 
have been more severely affected than the average. And it is on these 
vulnerable sectors that the services of poor countries are often concen-
trated. A lack of diversification is even more noticeable in poor coun-
tries that have managed to grow their services exports than is the case 
for goods. The ratio of services exports over GDP in the Common-
wealth small island community, for example, is five times larger than 
in the rest of the world (against a factor of two in goods). It seems that 
the services actually exported by SVEs have made them just as vul-
nerable as the goods exporting LDCs and LICs. A Commonwealth 
Secretariat/World Bank review in 2006 suggested that small states 
should reposition themselves in the global economy by diversifying 
into knowledge-based service industries such as tourism, finance, in-
surance, health, education, and information and communication tech-
nology services (Qureshi and te Velde, 2008). Could preferences help 
to induce this shift? 
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3.2. What would services preferences look like?  
 
Preferences on trade in goods have been controversial because, when 
effective, they have involved trade diversion as well as creation. 
Whether or not the diversion can be justified depends on whether 
there are offsetting development benefits. In practical terms, this 
means the following: will the preference lead to self-sustaining (and, 
ideally, diversifying) exports in a country that would not otherwise 
have achieved this?  
 
3.2.1. The features of ‘successful’ goods preferences 
 
Often goods preferences have been ineffective in that they either offer 
no significant commercial advantage to the notional beneficiary (as 
import restrictions on competitors are light) or are for goods that the 
beneficiary cannot produce sufficiently competitively (at least within 
the requirements of the origin rules). By definition, in such cases, 
there is neither a direct cost nor benefit.8 Yet there have also been 
some clear cases where preferences have conferred a commercial ad-
vantage and, in some of these, also a development benefit. At one ex-
treme is Mauritius which used the economic rent from EU sugar pref-
erences to invest in clothing and the rent from this to develop services. 
At the other are those Caribbean banana and sugar exporters for which 
preferences have kept alive (just) traditional trades that will probably 
cease once wider liberalization erodes the preference. In the middle 
are cases such as Lesotho’s clothing exports made possible by AGOA 
(USA’s African Growth and Opportunity Act) (which may survive the 
eventual removal of all WTO safeguards on Chinese exports) and 
Kenya’s horticulture exports to the EU (where competition is so se-
vere that only preference-receiving countries are able to maintain sig-
nificant market shares9).  
Both the development gains and the trade diversion costs tend 
to be case-specific. One consequence is that it is difficult to make a 
general conclusion that preferences have been ‘good or bad’. Another 
is to draw attention to the characteristic that to be ‘effective’ (which is 
a precondition for their being ‘developmentally good’) they must re-
spond to the specific production and market features of the target 
country. 
 
3.2.2. The ways in which services are different 
Since there is a prima facie case from goods trade that preferences can 
be useful in certain cases it makes sense to consider new preferences 
                                                 
8  Although there may be indirect costs such as erosion of most favoured nation treatment or 
the opportunity cost of negotiation. 
9  The term preference-recipient is used to cover all countries that pay lower than MFN tar-
iffs including, for example, Israel under its FTA with the EU. 
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on services for LDCs but, as pointed out by Melchior and Johnsen 
(2009), many questions arise. Some of these relate to the LDCs’ pro-
duction structure: many do not have the human resources or infra-
structure to produce tradable services. This problem is not unique to 
services; it is a variant of one that applies to preferences on goods 
trade. Countries that export, for example, mainly hard commodities 
rarely benefit from trade preferences since the international barriers 
that they face are generally low. Indeed, given the frequently observed 
macroeconomic effects of a large extractive industry one can even say 
that there is a tendency in such countries for trade that is immune to 
preferences to drive out trade that could benefit (as, for example, in 
Zambia). 
Other problems, though, do relate to characteristics of services 
trade that are different from those of goods.  Even though there are 
‘behind-the-border’ measures affecting trade in goods (such as stan-
dards) there are many more for trade in services, the regulation of 
which is much opaque, complex – and not necessarily negotiable.  A 
consequence is that services preferences need to be even more context 
specific than do those on goods if they are to be commercially useful. 
For preferences to be technically feasible there must be scope 
for governments to agree to, and effectively implement, liberalization. 
This is not always the case with services.  Professional services pro-
vide a good example. If domestic law establishes that no-one can call 
themselves an accountant or an auditor unless they belong to the ap-
propriate, non-governmental professional body then it is the member-
ship requirements of these bodies that have a major influence on 
whether trade can occur and in what form. And reform to their 
autonomously determined requirements may require wide-ranging 
change to domestic law involving considerations within which trade 
policy is a minor element.  
It may be the case that a foreign ‘accountant’ is not be permit-
ted to advertise their Mode 1 or 2 services or to practice via Modes 3 
and 4 unless they satisfy the requirements of the non-governmental 
professional body. And a domestically registered company may not be 
able to import the services of a foreign auditor that has not obtained 
such recognition. On the other hand, an individual can use any foreign 
accountant (registered or not) to undertake private, non-statutory work 
provided that they have the means to make contact, to receive the 
work and to pay. 
In none of these cases is there much scope for international ne-
gotiation – for one of two opposite reasons. One is jurisdictional: 
unless the requirements of the domestic professional body are grossly 
biased against foreign suppliers, they are unlikely to be required to 
amend them even as an indirect result of foreign trade negotiations. 
The other is practical: governments have difficulty restricting the im-
port through Modes 1 and 2 of professional services by private indi-
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viduals with a means of foreign exchange payment; and if govern-
ments are unable to interfere in trade, there is nothing to negotiate 
about.  
By definition, if governments are unable to restrict trade or un-
able to remove non-governmental restrictions there is no scope for 
‘liberalisation’ either multilaterally or selectively such as through 
preferences for poor countries. Attention on the scope for services 
preferences must be restricted, therefore, to areas of trade in which 
useful negotiations on liberalization is technically possible. And, as 
pointed out by Melchior and Johnsen (2009), a high proportion of 
these concern types of trade in which LDCs cannot participate or 
where liberalization faces significant domestic political obstacles (as 
with Mode 4).  
This suggests that any identification of commercially-useful 
services preferences for a given set of countries must be very specific. 
This view is reinforced because gains from services liberalization will 
often be less generalized than those for goods. If all tariffs are cut by 
half, for example, it will affect all sectors and any differences in the 
proportional effect can be easily calculated by reference to the initial 
tariff level. Moreover, it is clear what some of the immediate effects 
will be. There will be a transfer from the importing states’ revenue to 
elements in the supply chain. The distribution of this transfer between 
the stages in the supply chain are a matter for speculation, but one way 
or another the net effect is likely to be to increase international trade.  
With services trade there are no universal results: a change to 
horizontal rules of establishment, for example, though notionally of 
general impact may be of central importance to one (sub) sector but 
only of tangential relevance to another. Nor is the scale of the poten-
tial effect easily calculable. Take the example of national treatment 
(NT). If a foreign service provider is treated in exactly the same way 
as a national firm, this might appear to remove all discrimination 
against it. However, the main reason why a foreign services provider 
may be able to offer services more competitively than the domestic 
supplier is that it can draw upon resources (technical, financial or per-
sonnel) from its home base abroad. But NT does not, by itself, neces-
sarily give the firm the right to draw freely upon its resources abroad. 
Prudential requirements concerning reserves may require a firm to 
hold deposits in the host country rather than using its reserves in its 
home base. Immigration and work permit restrictions (outside the 
scope of Mode 4) may frustrate its attempt to utilise its foreign hold-
ings of technical and human resources. In other words, whereas NT in 
goods trade allows a firm to take advantage of all the support available 
to its domestic competitors yet also benefit from lower cost production 
in its home base, in the case of services NT means exactly what it 
says: foreign firms are treated no worse – but no better – than their 
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domestic competitors. Given the nature of services trade, this may re-
move, in whole or in part, their competitive advantage.  
 
3.2.3. A checklist for commercially useful services preferences 
To be commercially useful, therefore, any services preferences would 
need to meet the following tests. 
 
1. Do they remove a barrier that significantly limits either the vol-
ume or the value of exports from the target beneficiaries? 
2. Do the target’s competitors face the same barriers, and will 
these remain in place for their exports? 
3. Are there other barriers, not subject to preferences, that will 
prevent any increase in imports from the target countries? 
4. Do the target countries currently export the services covered by 
the preference? 
5. If not, could they reasonably be expected to develop a capacity 
with appropriate investment (of plausible levels) and, if so, how 
does the payback period of the investment relate to the likely 
duration of the preferences (which may be limited either by a 
finite application period or by the probability of more general-
ized liberalization? 
 
It is not necessary for any preference regime to be limited exclusively 
to the measures and products that offer positive answers to these ques-
tions. But unless there is at least a prima facie case that some elements 
in a broad package do produce positive answers the exercise may re-
sult simply in the addition of a further layer of complexity to interna-
tional rules without any offsetting gain. 
 
3.3. Services provisions in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
 
How far do the provisions of the only EPA so far to include a services 
chapter tick these boxes? This question is asked not to critique the 
EU-CARIFORUM EPA but to use it as a case study on the likelihood 
of conventional trade negotiations resulting in commercially useful 
services preferences. None of the 13 CARIFORUM states participat-
ing in the services EPA are LDCs,10 though many are SVEs, so the 
results present a ‘best case’: compared to LDCs, there is a wide range 
of services that these countries are able to produce competitively. But 
this is in itself useful: it shows the potential of a preference agreement 
to assist countries with relatively sophisticated services sectors; ad-
                                                 
10  The services chapter does not cover the Bahamas (which is not a WTO member) or Haiti 
(which is classified as LDC at WTO); since neither has submitted a GATS-compatible 
service offer they are excluded from EU preferences.  
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justments can then be made to take account of the more limited LDC 
supply capacity. 
The parties have expressed their concessions through a positive 
list approach covering all four modes and various sectors but with 
limitations.11 One feature that has an obvious implication for the mo-
dalities of any generalized services preference scheme is that there are 
not two schedules but 40 – different ones for each of the 13 
CARIFORUM and 27 EU states. Although this is a function of shared 
competences in the EU and of the absence of a common 
CARIFORUM services policy, it indicates that detailed preferences 
are likely to be country-specific. As with the GSP, the specific details 
of what is on offer vary markedly between preference-giving states. A 
‘services DFQF’ for LDCs is very far into the future.12  
In relation to the issue noted in Melchior and Johnsen (2009) 
on the origination of services supplies, the EPA provides that originat-
ing status requires a juridical person not only to have its registered of-
fice in a territory but also to engage in ‘substantive business opera-
tions’ there. 
In some respects, the EU’s offer is extensive but there are also 
important limitations. The sectors in which it has made commitments 
include business services, communication, construction, distribution, 
environmental services, financial service and recreational services 
(with entertainment services of particular interest to CARIFORUM). 
It has also made broad horizontal commitments. 
The EU’s horizontal offer on commercial presence applies to 
almost all economic activities although audio-visual services, national 
maritime cabotage and most air transport services are among the ex-
clusions and there are general reservations on the acquisition of land 
and public utilities. It includes a range of business services of particu-
lar interest for the Caribbean.13 Although some EU countries (mainly 
the new EU member states) have restricted the share of foreign in-
vestment for professional services and have limited access to health 
and social services (e.g. by economic needs tests), this does not appear 
to be too burdensome. The provisions on tourism and travel-related 
services offer broad access to hotels, restaurants and catering, travel 
agencies and tour operators, tourist guides and entertainment services 
(including live band, circus and discotheque services).  
Treatment for modes 1 and 2 covers many sectors (again with 
the exclusion of audio-visual services, national maritime cabotage, 
                                                 
11  As a reciprocal agreement both parties made ‘concessions’ but this paper focuses on those 
of the EU as a guide to what might be possible in an autonomous preference offer. Details 
of the CARIFORUM offers can be obtained in Stevens, Meyn and Kennan (2009) on 
which this section is based. 
12  DFQF = duty-free, quota-free. 
13  Such as legal services, accounting and bookkeeping, auditing, taxation advisory, architec-
ture, research and development (R&D), computer, real estate, several medical services, 
rental/leasing services without operators, environmental services, financial services and 
other business services (e.g. advertising, management, security, translation, educational 
services, maintenance, and telecommunication and postal services). 
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most air transport services as well as government services) and is gen-
erally wide ranging though there are important limitations for tele-
communication services, which are virtually excluded.14 Given the 
increasing importance of services provided via telecommunication this 
appears to be a serious limitation for Caribbean service providers. An-
other limitation applies to health and social services where almost all 
EU states have excluded mode 1 services for hotels, restaurants/ cater-
ing and cultural services.  
Given the relative importance of Mode 4 for LDCs, the provi-
sions in the EPA are of particular interest. The temporary presence of 
natural persons is limited to key personnel (senior employees and spe-
cialists working in the commercial presence); graduate trainees, busi-
ness services representatives, contractual service suppliers (employed 
by the commercial presence in either state), and independent self-
employed professionals. Commitments are linked to the sectors in 
which commercial presence has been offered and is limited to three 
years for intra-corporate transfers, one year for graduate trainees and 
90 days in any 12-month period for business visitors and business ser-
vice sellers.  
The EC has opened 29 sub-sectors for contractual service sup-
pliers which is limited to 6 months annually.15 It applies only to those 
with at least three years professional experience for contractual ser-
vice providers or six years for independent professionals, with a uni-
versity degree or an equivalent qualification and professional qualifi-
cation required in all cases except fashion models, chefs de cuisine 
and entertainment services.  
Although there are no quotas or economic ceilings, several EU 
countries have imposed nationality requirements or an economic 
needs test in some sectors. Moreover a very broad language is used 
when establishing general reservations in all sectors, providing a peg 
on which EU member states could hang restrictions to the presence of 
Caribbean key personnel, graduate trainees, contractual service sup-
pliers and independent professional – even if no such restrictions are 
detailed in the relevant annexes.  
An innovation that has attracted some attention is that annexed 
to the EPA is a Protocol on Cultural Cooperation. This aims to facili-
tate the temporary stay of artists and cultural professionals not covered 
in the services chapter following the 2005 United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s Convention on the Pro-
                                                 
14  The EU offer excludes any economic activity consisting of the provision of content that 
requires telecommunications services for its transport. Satellite broadcast transmission 
services ‘may be subject to obligations to safeguard general interest objectives.’ 
15  Including accounting and bookkeeping, taxation, engineering, medical service (dental, 
midwives, nurses, physiotherapists), computer and related services, R&D, management 
consulting, technical testing, fashion models, chefs de cuisine, travel agencies, tourist 
guides and entertainment services. Independent professionals have access to 11 high-
qualified sub-sectors such as architecture and urban planning, engineering, computer, 
R&D, management service and translation. 
Christopher Stevens 
 
44 
tection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. But no 
reference is made to the Protocol either in the text or in the annexes 
specifying parties’ service commitments. And the language of the Pro-
tocol is lax and does not include any enforceable provisions. 
 
3.4. Conclusions 
 
Only time will tell whether the EPA supports increased (or more re-
munerative) services exports, but as the analysis of services trade 
regulation suggests it is likely to be only a part of the process of re-
moving barriers. Given the lengthy negotiations (in which the 
CARIFORUM negotiators were extremely committed, believing the 
services provisions to offer the potential for a major improvement to 
the status quo) it is likely that identifying commercially useful prefer-
ences for LDCs will be time-consuming and will require country-
focussed analysis. As Melchior and Johnsen (2009) point out, restrict-
ing such preferences to LDCs (a group with a particularly low services 
supply capacity) makes the task much harder than would be the case if 
the net were widened somewhat.  
One implication is that services preferences are not sufficiently 
attractive to make them an acceptable alternative to other trade meas-
ures in support of LDCs. Full, widespread and enforceable DFQF for 
LDCs’ goods exports is likely to have a much more substantial initial 
impact as it would open markets for agricultural as well as manufac-
tures exports. Special quotas for LDCs on temporary migration could 
also be useful. As Melchior and Johnsen (2009) point out these would 
need to go beyond the visits covered by Mode 4 to respond to the cur-
rent supply capacity of most LDCs. 
If seen as an ‘addition’ rather than as an ‘alternative’ to such meas-
ures, though, services preferences could play a useful role. In those 
cases where goods preferences have been trade creating it has often 
been because the liberalising state has calculated that it has a political 
mandate to open up towards less competitive, smaller producers but 
not towards the most competitive. As generalised liberalisation 
spreads among OECD states the occasions where such a calculation 
needs to be made for goods has dwindled. But in the area of services 
there are many potential cases, where cautious opening towards a 
country likely not to supply large volumes of highly competitive ex-
ports is politically feasible whereas a GATS commitment is not. The 
provision of enabling architecture within the WTO allowing such re-
stricted liberalisation to occur for specific groups of countries might 
allow future experimentation. And if, together with DFQF and special 
temporary migration quotas, it were to provide a fillip to get Doha 
moving again, that would be a bonus! 
 4. Development and comparative advantage 
in services 
 
Arne Melchior 
 
Abstract 
 
Since the purpose of services trade preferences is to promote devel-
opment and reduce poverty, it is important to know how services trade 
is related to development. Trade in services takes place according to 
the four supply modes defined by the WTO, and the analysis must 
therefore address FDI and temporary migration as well as ordinary 
services trade. 
 
 According to WTO data, international trade in goods and services 
have grown at the same pace during 1990-2008. International FDI 
has grown almost twice as fast during the same period. Cross-
border trade (Mode 1 of the GATS) and commercial presence 
(Mode 3, including FDI) are the most important modes of supply. 
 Rich countries have larger services sectors and are on average net 
exporters of services as well as net suppliers of FDI. While devel-
oping countries have developed a significant trade surplus for 
trade in goods, they are on average net importers of services as 
well as FDI. For migration, net flows go in the opposite direction: 
from poor to rich countries. For services, there is a lot of two-way 
trade between rich countries. 
 During 1990-2007, lower middle income countries had continuous 
growth in their income levels and their share of world trade, and 
trade in goods grew faster than trade in services. The Least De-
veloped countries experienced growth during 2000-2007, and 
their goods trade and services imports increased considerably. 
While their exports of goods grew fast, their services exports 
lagged behind. Probably due to aid, LDCs have relatively high 
services imports. 
 At the more disaggregated level, there are considerable differences 
across services sectors: Rich countries tend to be net exporters of 
skill-based services; developing countries do better for passenger 
travel and tourism; and construction and freight are intermediate 
cases. The ranking across sectors is mostly similar for LDCs and 
other developing countries. The notable exception is computer and 
related services, where India’s export success has boosted devel-
oping country performance. This is however still the exception 
rather than the rule. For LDCs, tourism is the most important ser-
vices activity. 
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 Developed nations have 80% of outward and 2/3 of inward FDI. 
LDCs have a significant share of inward FDI but almost no out-
ward FDI. About 2/3 of world FDI is in services, with financial 
services and business services as the leading sectors. 
 Temporary movement (Mode 4 trade) has also increased but cur-
rent data availability is very limited. Such trade is estimated to 
represent 1-2% of total services trade but the figure is uncertain. 
Mode 4 trade is much more restricted than Modes 1-3 and with a 
more liberal regime, such trade could increase.  
 
4.1. Introduction: Rich countries produce more services 
 
It is well known that the proportion of services production in GDP in-
creases with income: Poor countries may have shares at 50% or even 
lower, while the share for the richest countries is typically about 70% 
or even higher. Figure 4.1 plots value added in services as a percent-
age of GDP on the horizontal axis, and the income level (GDP per 
capita, PPP) on the vertical axis. We use 2005 in order to obtain the 
highest possible data coverage. 
 
Figure 4.1: Income level versus the share of services in 
GDP (based on 2005 data from World Development Indicators)
y = 477.58e0.0442x
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In spite of some non-typical observations and heterogeneity across 
countries there is a statistically significant positive relationship: richer 
countries have on average larger services sectors. The exponential cur-
ve captures 28% of the variation and the graph shows that for develop-
ing countries, there is huge variation in the services share of GDP. For 
higher income levels, the majority of countries have a high services 
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share of GDP, with a cluster between 70 and 80%. There are various 
reasons why rich countries produce more services, for example: 
 
- Richer countries generally have a larger public sector. 
- In rich countries, wages and therefore also price levels for services 
are higher and this boosts the GDP share for services. 
- Rich countries have higher skill levels and therefore larger produc-
tion of skill-intensive services.  
- The transfer of labour-intensive manufacturing away from the 
richest countries may have contributed to their higher services 
share in GDP. 
 
4.2. The GATS supply modes and the growth in world 
trade 
 
Since services can be delivered in different ways, as reflected in the 
four modes of the GATS, there is no easily available single figure for 
services trade. Mode 1 (cross-border trade) and mode 2 (consumption 
abroad) are in principle covered by the services trade statistics pub-
lished by statistical agencies. Mode 3 (commercial presence) is mainly 
covered by FDI (foreign direct investment) statistics. Mode 4 could 
partly be included in migration statistics, but temporary migration to 
deliver services is generally difficult to trace in migration data so in 
practice statistics for Mode 4 trade are rather limited.  
Various attempts have been made to quantify the relative im-
portance of the various modes. A difficulty is that trade flows in 
Modes 1 and 2 are not comparable to FDI stocks in Mode 3 or the 
number of temporary migrants in Mode 4; and it is not easy obtain 
accurate statistics on the service sales flows corresponding to Modes 3 
and 4. Current figures should therefore be considered as approxima-
tions only. According to Francois et al. (2009), the composition was as 
follows in 2004: 
 
Table 4.1: The importance of various GATS modes in world ser-
vices trade 2004 
 USD Billion % of total 
Mode 1 Cross-border trade 2034 48.2 
Mode 2 Consumption abroad 620 14.7 
Mode 3 Commercial presence 1500 35.5 
Mode 4 Producer movement  70 1.7 
Total Modes 1-4 4225 100 
Source: Francois et al. (2009), Table 1 page 11. 
 
Hence according to this, cross-border trade and commercial presence 
are the most important modes. UNCTAD(2004, 98) present estimates 
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based on affiliate sales ands according to that, Mode 3 is currently 
more than half of world services trade. For some countries, the ratio 
between services exports and foreign affiliates’ sales was up to 2.5 in 
2001 (ibid.). Hence estimates vary somewhat, and we are not able to 
draw a final verdict about the exact shares. 
The relative importance of each mode depends on technology 
as well as barriers. For example, market access in Mode 4 is restricted 
due to the sensitive nature of migration issues, and more liberal trad-
ing conditions might result in larger trade (Winters 2003). The expan-
sion of India’s exports of information technology services in recent 
years illustrates the role of technology: trades that were impossible a 
few years ago may now be undertaken due to better communication 
and data flows. 
 There is some uncertainty with respect to the growth rates of 
world goods trade versus world services trade. Data from the WTO 
database (www.wto.org) suggest that world services trade during 
1990-2008 grew at approximately the same speed as goods trade: The 
share of services in world goods+services trade fluctuated between 
18.2 and 19.9% with no clear trend. These statistics capture Mode 1 
and – depending on data availability – Mode 2. Contrary to this, Fran-
cois et al. (2009) conclude that during 1996-2004, world Mode 1 ser-
vices trade grew much faster than world goods trade. Hoekman and 
Mattoo (2008) report a slight increase in the worldwide ratio of ser-
vices imports to GDP, from 11 to 12%. This was mainly due to import 
growth in developed and upper middle income countries; there was 
actually a decline in this ratio for lower middle income and low in-
come countries. Facing the uncertainty in reported trends, which may 
partly be due to the limits of available data, we choose to believe in 
the WTO data: world services trade (Modes 1 and 2) has grown at par 
with merchandise trade and constitute slightly less than 1/5 of world 
trade in goods + services trade (Modes 1 and 2). 
Comparing UNCTAD data on world FDI with WTO data on 
trade, there is however no doubt that FDI grew much faster than trade 
in goods and services. The ratio of FDI stocks as well as flows to 
world merchandise trade almost doubled from 1990 to 2008. Given 
that more than half of world FDI is in services and this share has 
grown over time (see analysis below), the most dynamic element 
seems to be Mode 3 services trade.  
 
4.3. Comparative advantage in services: The aggregate 
pattern 
 
On the background of section 4.1 we might expect that rich countries 
should also have a comparative advantage in services and be net ex-
porters. This is indeed true, but it is not the whole truth: Some middle-
income countries have significant exports in particular services sec-
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tors. For example, some poor countries have extensive tourism, and 
some offshore financial centres have relatively low income per capita. 
Due to these “exceptions”, the positive relationship between income 
levels and services exports is weakened.  In Figure 4.2, we show the 
ratio of services exports to GDP on the horizontal axis, and par capita 
income on the vertical axis. 
 
Figure 4.2: Income per capita versus the share of services exports 
in GDP (based on 2005 data from WDI)
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There is a positive and significant relationship but it is relatively 
weak.16  
 Figure 4.2 is based on services trade data that mainly capture 
cross-border trade (GATS Mode 1) and to some extent Mode 2 (con-
sumption abroad). The picture is therefore incomplete since it does not 
include services trade in Mode 3 (commercial presence) of Mode 4 
(temporary movement of service providers). Mode 3 is reasonably 
well captured by FDI statistics, but data on Mode 4 are very scarce. 
As a very crude proxy for elements of Mode 4 we will therefore some-
times use data on migration and remittances; however with a strong 
note of caution since Mode 4 trade only represents a tiny part of mi-
gration.  
 In the further analysis, it is convenient for analytical purposes 
as well as presentation to distinguish between five country groups: 
These are LDC (the 49 Least Developed Countries), LLM (other Low 
and Lower Middle Income, 51 countries), and three higher-income 
groups (EU-27, upper middle and high-income, see Appendix C for 
                                                 
16  The trend line has R2=0.12 but if a couple of extreme observations are dropped (one is not 
shown in the diagram), the explained variation drops to 3%. A similar graph using net ser-
vices exports/GDP obtains R2=0.08 so there is a positive relationship but not very strong.  
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details. We will generally use the term “developing countries” for 
UM+LLM+LDC. 
In the following analysis as well as the more detailed examina-
tion of individual sectors in Appendix C, we sometimes use simple 
specialisation indexes or “Balassa indexes” of the form (x-m)/(x+m), 
where x is export and m import. If all trade is exports the index is 1, if 
all is imports it is -1, and if trade is balanced it is zero. This index is a 
simple measure of comparative advantage. 
 In Figure 4.3 we show the Balassa indexes for goods trade, 
services trade, FDI and migrants’ transfers for the five country 
groups.17 We use the year 2005 in order to obtain the most extensive 
data coverage. Observe that the aggregate results for goods, services 
etc. hide that there are differences across sectors. We will revert to 
some of these sector differences later. 
 
                                                 
17  Data are from IMF: Balance of Payments (BOP) online statistics, except the FDI figure 
for LDC which is based on data from the UNCTAD online FDI database. The reason for 
the latter is limited LDC coverage for outward FDI in the BOP data. 
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Figure 4.3: Net specialisation indexes for goods trade, services 
trade, FDI and migrants’ transfers, for five country groups in 
2005 
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- For trade in goods, developing countries have a comparative ad-
vantage (are net exporters) but the more advanced developing 
countries (UM. LLM) perform better. The LDC group is barely 
above zero; indicating their limited supply capacity in spite of low 
labour cost. 
- For services trade, the pattern in 4.3(b) corresponds to Figure 4.2; 
net exports are higher, the richer you are. But the deficit for LLM 
is very small, confirming some ambiguity also for this relation-
ship.  
- For FDI, the pattern is overwhelmingly clear; net outflows are 
from rich to developing countries and the poorest countries have 
virtually no outward FDI. 
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- For migrants’ transfers, the pattern is mixed but tends to be oppo-
site to FDI, with net outward transfers from the richer countries 
and net inflows in developing countries. Observe that there is no 
net inflow into LDCs (see Chapter 6 for more analysis).  
 
For the WTO, this aggregate pattern has important implications: Lib-
eralisation of trade in goods is particularly important in order allow 
poor countries to exploit their comparative advantage, and liberalisa-
tion of trade in services is particularly important in order to exploit the 
comparative advantage of the richer countries. If such specialisation is 
allowed, rich countries will benefit from better goods, and developing 
countries from better services. That is a simple logic that tends to be 
forgotten sometimes in the “mercantilist” atmosphere of trade negotia-
tions. This is however only the aggregate picture; in addition there 
will be sub-sectors within each aggregate where the pattern of com-
parative advantage varies, which we revert to below.  
 For factor movement, it is evident that rich countries can offer 
more capital, and developing countries more labour. While the overlap 
between Mode 4 trade and migration in general is limited, there is 
such a link and it is indeed no surprise that developing countries hope 
for freer movement of labour also for the delivery of services.  
 The results here are based on a snapshot for 2005 and it is evi-
dent that the pattern changes over time. In figures 4.4 and 4.5, we 
show trends over time for LDC and LLM, respectively, indicating 
how their shares of the world total have changed over time for various 
items.18 When interpreting the figures, it should be recalled that FDI 
grew faster than trade in goods and services so the shares do not tell 
the whole story (cf. analysis above). For the developing countries, 
share of world economic aggregates are generally lower than their 
share of the world population. As a background it may therefore be 
recalled that in 2008, LDC represented about 800 million people or 
12% of the world population, while LLM included 3.8 billion or 58%. 
Their shares of economic aggregates are generally much lower, pre-
cisely since they are developing countries with lower income levels. 
 
                                                 
18  Data are from World Development Indicators, online version. For GDP and population, 
we used samples with a constant number of countries during 1990-2008. The number of 
observations is 161 for nominal GDP, 159 for GDP-PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) and 
199 for population. For goods and services trade, we allowed some variation in country 
coverage over time so the number of observations is varying in the range 141-162 over 
the period (30-40 for LDC).  
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Figure 4.4: LLM (other low- and lower middle income) 
countries' shares of world totals, for GDP and trade
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For the LLM group including China and India, all curves generally 
increase except for a modest stagnation phase in 1998-2000 that is 
linked to the Asian crisis. Measured in shares, goods trade is more dy-
namic and the share for exports grew faster than imports. Hence LLM 
increased their net export ratio or Balassa index from zero in 1990 to 
0.06 in 2007. For services, trade grew more at par with nominal GDP 
and the Balassa index did not change much over time.   
 
Figure 4.5: LDC share of world totals 1990-2007, for GDP and 
trade
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For LDCs, the pattern is more mixed and for many of the time series 
there was a reversal of the trend, with falling shares and marginalisa-
tion at the beginning and increases towards the end of the period for 
most series. Towards the end, there were fast increases for GDP, 
manufacturing exports and services imports. Some LDCs have signifi-
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cant commodity exports and before the onset of the financial crisis, 
these exports grew and contributed to growth.  
For services, Figure 5.5 shows that LDC is a particularly large 
importer of services relative to its economic size. A possible explana-
tion for the large LDC services imports is that is driven by aid. This is 
confirmed by regression analysis (not reported in detail); aid is a sig-
nificant determinant of services imports. For services exports, how-
ever, there was no increase and LDC exports grew slightly lower than 
the world aggregate. For the LDCs, the export/GDP ratio for services 
even fell during the last decade, contrary to the other variables. Recent 
LDC growth (before the financial crisis) was particularly driven by 
manufacturing exports; see e.g. UNCTAD (2008).19 As examined by 
UNCTAD (2006), LDC goods exports focus on (resource-intensive) 
processing of spices, fish and fishery products, as well as labour-
intensive manufacturing (especially the garment exports of Bangla-
desh).  
 Figures 4.4. and 4.5 also reveal the huge difference in eco-
nomic size between LLM and LDC. While LLM is five time larger 
than LDC in terms of population, the group is 10-24 times larger for 
economic variables –  around 20 times larger for most economic vari-
ables.  
 
4.4. Comparative advantage in services trade: Differ-
ences across sectors 
 
The patterns shown for aggregate goods and services trade hide con-
siderable differences across sectors. For trade in goods, it is well 
known that poor countries have a particular edge in low-skill labour-
intensive sectors, while the rich countries perform better in skill-
intensive differentiated goods. Similar differences also exist for ser-
vices. The following analysis is based on Appendix C, where we pre-
sent a number of fact sheets for world services trade. The fact sheets 
cover 14 sub-sectors reported in IMFs BOP (balance-of-payments) 
statistics, including information about net trade patterns for major 
country groups. Given the focus of the analysis on development in 
general and the LDCs in particular, we focus particularly on LLM and 
LDC when reporting the results. 
 Even if the average LDC export performance in services was 
weak, it can be seen from Appendix C that the performance varied 
across sub-sectors. In some sectors there was an increase, in spite of 
                                                 
19  See e.g. UNCTAD’s Least Developed Countries Report 2009, page 144: "...this Report 
focuses on industrialization via manufacturing, which does not deny the importance of 
services, which also registered high rates of growth in some LDCs, especially in island 
LDCs. However, given that the growth has been registered largely in the petty trade, low 
productivity services in most LDCs in the informal sector (for which no reliable data are 
available), and given the heterogeneity of services, it is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to include the services sector in the analysis." 
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the overall weak performance of LDCs in services exports. In Figure 
4.6, we show the LDC share of world exports in 2005, for selected 
sub-sectors. As a benchmark for comparison, wee also show LDC 
shares for some of the aggregates discussed above. 
 
Figure 4.6: The LDCs' shares of the world, for services exports 
and other items, 2005. Based on data from IMF: Balance of Payments 
Statistics and World Bank: World Development Indicators.
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The importance of tourism for development is well known and dis-
cussed in e.g. Grosso et al. (2007), Honeck (2008). Measuring tourism 
is difficult since the sector has strong linkages to other services sectors 
such as hotels and restaurants, transports etc. Contrary to the situation 
for services trade in general, we find some sectors where the LDCs 
have positive Balassa indexes and are net exporters. This is reflected 
in Figure 4.6 by larger shares of the world total for passenger trans-
ports, travel services and communication services. While the role of 
tourism in some LDCs is well documented and may explain the high 
shares for travel and passenger transports, we do no have an immedi-
ate explanation of the high share for communication services. This is 
surprising and may be driven by tourism as well as aid-related activ-
ity.  
At the other end of the scale, we find more technologically ad-
vanced sectors: insurance, financial services, computer and informa-
tion services.20 The sector “Personal, cultural and recreational ser-
vices” also contains audiovisual services, which is more high-tech and 
                                                 
20  Observe from Appendix C that for financial services, LDCs are some years’ net exporters.  
This is partly due Vanuatu, which is listed by the Financial Stability Board as an offshore 
financial centre. But also Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Uganda had export surpluses some 
years. We have not examined the explanation of this in more detail. 
Arne Melchior 
 
56 
this may explain why it is at the lower end of the LDC range of spe-
cialisation. For many of the skill-intensive sectors, commercial pres-
ence is a core model of supply, and the low LDC share of outward 
FDI is a related fact that we examine below. 
 The LLM group is one step up the ladder. Given the promi-
nence of emerging markets such as China and the success of India’s 
services exports, we might expect the sector pattern to be different for 
LLM, compared to LDC. In order to examine this, Figure 4.7 shows 
the similar graph for the LLM countries. 
 
Figure 4.7: LLM shares of world services exports, 2005
Calculated based on data from IMF: Balance of Payments Statistics.
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The main change compared to LDC, apart from the generally higher 
levels, is the spectacular performance of computer and information 
services. This is driven by India: 87% of LLM export of computer and 
information services in 2007 was from India (37.5 billion USD), and 
India was the world’s largest exporter in the sector. Hence the top per-
formance of this sector is not a general feature of the LLM group; 
China had most the remaining 13% of LLM export in 2007. An issue 
is whether the ICT success of India could be replicated in other poor 
countries, or whether it is possible only in India due to the country’s 
large pool of skilled labour, combined with the familiarity with the 
English language. For a discussion of India’s ICT revolution, see 
Karmakar (2008). 
 Apart from the ICT sector, however, the ranking of sectors is 
largely similar to the LDC pattern. Also here we find finance, insur-
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ance and personal services at the bottom, construction in the middle, 
and travel and communication at the top. 
 Low shares in services exports for LDC and LLM must corre-
spond with high shares for others. In Appendix C, it is easily con-
firmed that for the high-income countries and EU, the rankings are 
reversed and finance is on top. What should be observed is that the 
combined share for EU+high income in world exports has decreased 
over time for some sectors such as transport, construction, travel. In 
these cases, it is mainly LLM and upper middle income countries that 
have expanded; except for travel where even LDC has taken a meas-
urable share of the total. 
 Our analysis of the sector composition of developing country 
exports confirms the picture emerging from the macro-analysis: De-
veloping countries have, on average, a slight comparative disadvan-
tage in services; although there is considerable variation across sec-
tors. Over time, developing countries have increased their market 
shares in some important sectors. Income convergence, especially be-
tween LLM and the rich countries, could also lead to convergence be-
tween rich and poor countries over time in terms of their services ex-
port performance.  
 
4.5. FDI and services trade 
 
For several types of services, commercial presence is the only feasible 
form of delivery, and in other cases there may be a combination of 
commercial presence and other modes. For example, telecommunica-
tion services are traded across borders (Mode 1) but in addition, cross-
border FDI (Mode 3) plays an important role. As shown above, Mode 
3 constitutes a major services supply mode.  
 In general, a considerable share of international FDI is North-
North, but some is North-South with more outflows going from rich to 
developing countries. South-South FDI has recently increased but still 
has a modest share of total FDI. As a platform for analysing Norway’s 
FDI patterns, we present some recent evidence on global FDI flows. 
Table 4.2 shows the global distribution of inward and outward FDI by 
country groups, based on the most recent UNCTAD data: 
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Table 4.2: Inward and outward FDI in 2008: 
Percentages of the world total 
 Inward Outward 
 Stock Flow Stock Flow 
World 100 100 100 100 
Developed economies 68.50 56.69 84.07 81.09 
EU 43.14 29.66 49.90 45.06 
USA 15.29 18.62 19.51 16.78 
Developing economies 28.68 36.57 14.54 15.76 
Africa 3.42 5.16 0.60 0.50 
Latin America and the Caribbean 7.93 8.51 3.46 3.40 
Dev. Asia and Oceania 17.33 22.90 10.47 11.85 
South East Europe and the CIS 2.82 6.74 1.39 3.15 
     
Developing and transition economies 31.50 43.31 15.93 18.91 
Least Developed Countries 0.91 1.95 0.06 0.21 
Source: Calculated on the basis of UNCTAD (2009), Annex Tables B.1 and B2. 
 
Hence developed nations have more than 80% of outward FDI and 
about 2/3 of inward FDI. Corresponding to this, developing countries 
have a considerable net inflow. The Least Developed Countries have a 
significant share of inward FDI but a very small share of outward in-
vestment. Figure 4.2(c) above also confirms this strong North-South 
pattern. 
 Investment in the services sectors constitutes a large share of 
world FDI. This share has increased during the last decades and now 
approaches 2/3. Figures for 2007 are shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Distribution across sectors and country groups for inward FDI 
stocks in 2007. 
(A) Distribution by sector for each country group and the world total 
 Developed Developing SEE&CIS World 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Primary 7.46 6.31 22.88 7.47 
Manufacturing 28.07 24.02 26.05 27.05 
Services 63.03 67.77 44.98 63.84 
– Trade 11.89 6.87 7.21 10.58 
– Transport, storage and comm. 5.71 6.45 4.45 5.86 
– Finance 21.22 14.28 13.32 19.38 
– Business activities 13.27 35.15 16.05 18.64 
     
(B) Distribution by country group for each sector and the world total 
 Developed Developing SEE&CIS World 
Total 73.79 24.31 1.89 100 
Primary 73.66 20.54 5.80 100 
Manufacturing 76.58 21.59 1.82 100 
Services 72.86 25.81 1.33 100 
– Trade 82.92 15.79 1.29 100 
– Transport, storage and comm. 71.81 26.75 1.44 100 
– Finance 80.79 17.91 1.30 100 
– Business activities 52.52 45.85 1.63 100 
Note: SEE&CIS = South East Europe and the CIS. 
Data source: Calculated from UNCTAD (2009); Annex A, Table A.I.4. 
 
Hence in 2007, 64% of world inward FDI stocks were in services. 
74% of these stocks were in developed countries, with particularly 
high shares for trade and financial services. Developing countries had 
a particularly high share of inward FDI for business services. Eastern 
Europe and the CIS had large inward FDI in agriculture. 
Also for LLM, the share of outward FDI (shown in Figure 4.7, 
here included in “developing”) is lower than the group’s relative size, 
in spite of all the talk about China’s outward FDI. Given the important 
role of FDI in total services trade, it is another piece of evidence con-
firming that in spite of India’s ICT success, services exports is on av-
erage the least dynamic element of LLM trade. As for the LDCs, the 
share of inward FDI is much higher than for outward FDI; for the 
LLMs approximately at the same level as the group’s share in world 
nominal GDP. China and India are different from LDCs due to their 
large markets and recent high growth; and especially China has at-
tracted large amount of inward FDI even if the country still scores low 
on various indicators of the “ease of doing business”. A closed look at 
the data shows that during 1994-2007, China absorbed 63% of inward 
FDI to the LLM group and represented 54% of its outward FDI. India 
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absorbed 6% of LLM inward FDI and had 19% of the group’s out-
ward FDI (with a higher share towards the end of the period).21 
For outward FDI, LDC is at the low end of the scale, as also 
shown in Figure 4.6. The extremely low share of world outward FDI 
for the LDCs is a signal that trade preferences in GATS Mode 3 may 
not be easy for them to exploit.  
The LDCs have a much higher share for inward FDI and this 
may contribute to the development of some of their services sectors. 
According to UNCTAD (2004), finance and business services are sec-
tors where inward FDI is particularly important in developing coun-
tries. Ramasamy and Yeung (2007) find that inward FDI in services is 
driven mainly by the same determinants as FDI in manufacturing: FDI 
is positively related to market size and economic growth; factor costs 
(for labour and capital) also matter; openness is positive; and the qual-
ity of infrastructure and the ease of doing business is important. The 
LDCs have a low score on many of these factors and this may explain 
why their share of inward FDI is considerably lower than their share 
of world GDP. Attracting more investment in tourism-related sectors 
could be particularly important for the LDCs, given the strong link-
ages of tourism to other sectors.  
 
4.6. Mode 4 global trade 
 
Appropriate data on Mode 4 delivery of services generally do not ex-
ist, and this also applies to Norway. There are several reasons for this: 
 
- Some of the Mode 4 activity, such as business visits of limited du-
ration, is not registered in the migration statistics. 
- In migration statistics, temporary and long-term migration are not 
separated. Since there is no WTO definition of the duration of 
temporariness, this would also be difficult. 
- To the extent that temporary migration is reported, it is difficult to 
distinguish services from non-services, and commercial from non-
commercial.  
 
Hence if reliable data on Mode 4 trade is to be obtained, a major effort 
has to be made. For discussions, see e.g. Mattooo and Carzaniga 
(2003, various chapters) and Magdeleine and Maurer (2008). 
 As shown in Table 4.1, current estimates indicate that Mode 4 
constitutes a modest 1-2% of total world services trade. In the WTO, 
Mode 4 has until now been linked to commercial presence; i.e. by fa-
cilitating commercial visits, intra-company transfer etc. Hence FDI 
statistics provide some indirect information also on Mode 4: FDI has 
increased considerably, much of it is North-North, but with a substan-
                                                 
21  For India, data is missing for 2007 so we use the 1994-2006 period. 
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tial North-South component. For the FDI-related Mode 4 trade, trends 
should be similar. 
 Mode 4 trade is clearly limited by the modest number of com-
mitments in GATS. If more liberalisation took place, temporary 
movement to deliver services could clearly expand considerably. This 
however touches upon national migration policies which politically 
represent a highly sensitive area. Figure 4.5(d) above is a first indica-
tion to the effect that while poor countries do not have abundance of 
skills and capital, they have large populations that are ready to move. 
Hence for semi- and low-skilled labour, the pattern of comparative 
advantage is reversed and poor countries have an interest in greater 
market access. 
 In the DDA, developing countries have requested that Mode 4 
should be de-linked from Mode 3 and that temporary movement of 
less skilled labour should also be allowed. Contrary to services trade 
and FDI, there is little doubt about the “capacity to move” for less 
skilled labour categories. Even if the largest component of world mi-
gration flows is South-South (see Chapter 6), the second largest com-
ponent is South-North and there is clearly a net outflow from poor to 
rich countries. Also the poorest countries have substantial outward 
migration. While the LDCs perform below average on services ex-
ports and FDI, their share of migration is high.  The LDC share of the 
world population is about 12%, but their share of world outward mi-
gration in 2000 was 14%. The LDCs do not have much capital and 
skilled labour, but a lot of labour with lower skills. Even if Mode 4 
trade and migration are two different things, they are related and 
Mode 4 liberalisation raises issues where the literature and evidence 
on migration provides useful and relevant knowledge. In Chapter 6, 
we therefore provide an overview of issues related to migration. 
 5. Norway’s services trade and the  
potential impact of trade preferences 
 
Arne Melchior 
 
Abstract 
 
If the scope for trade preferences for services is increased, current 
trade patterns may indicate where such preferences may be success-
fully applied if they are to be effective. The analysis below shows that 
Norway’s trade pattern partly conforms to the global patterns shown 
in Chapter 4.  But due to the proximity and integration with Europe, 
Norway’s services trade with developing countries is more limited 
than for the world at large.  
 
 Norway has traditionally had large services trade, with shipping 
exports as a driving force. In spite of the rising importance of the 
oil and gas sector, services trade is still important, with a share of 
GDP that is higher than for the Euro area. 
 Norway is currently a large net exporter of maritime services and 
other transport and communication services, and a significant net 
importer of travel services. The USA is a significant market for 
shipping and 29% of services exports go to North America. For 
services imports, 80% comes from Europe. 
 Norway’s imports of services from developing countries is very 
limited, and large countries such as China, India and Brazil have 
much lower shares in Norway’s imports of services than for 
goods. According to the data available, Norway recently did not 
import services from LDCs. Some imports of tourism may how-
ever be unregistered.  
 At 50%, the share of services in FDI is somewhat lower for Nor-
way than for the world, due to FDI related to oil and gas. Almost 
all inward FDI was from OECD or Offshore Financial Centres, 
while 15% of outward FDI was directed to developing countries. 
There was virtually no inward FDI from LDCs, and the outward 
FDI to LDCs was mainly related to oil. 
 We have no data on Mode 4 services trade, but since current Mode 
4 trade is linked to FDI, the FDI evidence indirectly shed light on 
Mode 4 as well. In addition, we use migration data to illustrate the 
geographical distribution of migrants. A large share of immigra-
tion into Norway is from developing countries, and 14% of the 
inward migrant stock was from the LDCs. 
 Since Norway’s registered services imports from LDCs are close 
to or equal to zero according to the analysis, the short-term mate-
rial impact of preferential market access for LDCs in Norway is 
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likely to be limited. For Mode 4, there may be scope for an in-
crease if market access is improved for less skilled workers. This 
is however a politically controversial issue and the impact will 
depend on the measures taken. In order to help the LDCs develop 
their services sectors, the analysis suggests that aid and invest-
ment will be more important than market access discrimination. 
Hence a wider perspective on SDT (Special and Differential 
Treatment) is needed. 
 
5.1. Introduction   
 
Norway is a small and rich country. The relationship between income 
level and services trade was examined in Chapter 4. Norway’s trade 
pattern in services partly corresponds to the global patterns shown 
there. In addition, there are other particular features which strongly 
affect Norway’s services trade: 
 
- Through the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, Norway 
is fully integrated in the EU internal market. This includes far-
reaching liberalisation for services trade, FDI and even labour 
movements.  
- Norway is abundant in some natural resources (oil and gas, hy-
droelectric power, fish) and especially the oil sector has strong in-
fluence on the economy in general and the trade pattern.  
- Norway smallness implies that it is sometimes a marginal market: 
when an LDC starts outward FDI, Norway is not likely to be the 
first destination.   
 
5. 2. Norway’s cross-border services trade 
 
Norway has traditionally relied more on services exports than other 
OECD countries; especially due to exports of maritime services (ship-
ping). This is still the case, in spite of the fact that oil and gas exports 
have shifted the balance towards a growing export surplus for trade in 
goods. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show exports and imports as % of GDP, for 
of goods and services and for Norway and the Euro area, respectively 
(data source: World Development Indicators). 
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Figure 5.1: Trade/GDP ratios for Norway
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Figure 5.2: Trade/GDP ratios for the Euro area
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The trade/GDP ratio for services is substantially higher for Norway 
than for the Euro area. This gap however decreased over time, due to a 
rising ratio in the Euro area and a slight fall in this ratio for Norway. 
Both export and imports of services was in 2004 around 10% of GDP 
in Norway, with a modest export surplus. Services trade also grew 
considerably, but growth was smaller than for Norwegian GDP (hence 
the falling shares) as well as services trade in the Euro area.  
 Table 5.1 provides an overview of the composition of Nor-
way’s services trade in 2004, in terms of trade partners and services 
sectors. In the table, all values for exports (imports) are expressed in 
% of total services exports (imports). Hence the top rows in each sec-
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tion of the table gives the allocation across geographical areas for total 
services exports and imports, respectively, and the column to the right 
(Sum) gives the allocation across sectors. In the lowest part, we show 
simple specialisation indexes ranging from -100 (only imports) to 100 
(only exports).22 
 
Table 5.1: Norway’s services trade in 2004:  
Distribution across sectors and geographical areas 
Area 
 
EU/EEA Other Europe
North 
America 
Central 
& South 
America 
Africa Asia & Oceania Sum
Services exports (% of total) 
Services, total 57.44 3.45 28.74 2.68 0.51 7.18 100 
Maritime services 20.26 1.95 17.89 0.97 0.16 4.97 46.21 
Other transp./comm. 8.97 0.25 1.73 0.62 0.13 0.31 12.01 
Travel services 9.22 0.54 1.28 0.01 0.02 0.19 11.27 
Financial services 2.87 0.13 0.75 0.08 0.00 0.10 3.93 
Business services 14.75 0.50 6.74 1.00 0.14 1.47 24.60 
Other services 1.36 0.09 0.35 0.00 0.06 0.12 1.98 
Services imports (% of total) 
Services, total 73.96 5.11 10.82 1.09 0.70 8.31 100 
Maritime services 17.98 1.77 2.64 0.68 0.48 6.88 30.44 
Other transp./comm. 4.87 0.46 0.96 0.02 0.01 0.26 6.57 
Travel services 30.99 1.39 2.24 0.05 0.04 0.13 34.83 
Financial services 2.52 0.09 0.81 0.25 0.00 0.06 3.73 
Business services 16.19 1.30 3.69 0.08 0.10 0.78 22.14 
Other services 1.42 0.11 0.47 0.02 0.07 0.19 2.29 
Specialisation index (between -100 and +100) 
Services, total -9 -16 48 45 -12 -3 4 
Maritime services 10 9 76 21 -48 -12 24 
Other transp./comm. 33 -26 32 94 89 13 33 
Travel services -51 -41 -24 -57 -21 22 -48 
Financial services 10 20 0 -48 -23 29 6 
Business services -1 -42 33 87 21 34 9 
Other services 2 -8 -12 -100 -5 -18 -3 
Memo item: Area distribution for Norway’s trade in goods (2004) 
Goods exports 76.73 3.81 
12.3
7 1.20 0.45 5.44 100 
Goods imports 66.46 9.42 7.20 2.54 1.09 13.29 100 
Data source: Calculated on the basis of Statistics Norway: External account by country, Table 3 on 
http://www.ssb.no/urland/. More detail on classification is available there. 
 
The bottom rows also show, as a benchmark for comparison, the geo-
graphical distribution for goods trade. Here the share for the 
                                                 
22  These are calculated as 100*(x-m)/(x+m), where x=exports and m=imports. 
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EU/European Economic Area is particularly high for exports, since 
exports of oil and gas are mainly destined for the EU.  But even for 
goods imports, the EU/EEA share is a high 2/3.  
 Along with trade in goods, Norway’s services imports are 
strongly concentrated on the EU/EEA, with a 74% share. Services ex-
ports are more dispersed, especially due to the high share of shipping 
exports to the USA. As shown by the specialisation index, Norway 
has a considerable trade surplus for maritime services in general and 
particularly to North America, and these exports represent 18% of to-
tal services exports. Norway also has a significant trade surplus for 
other transport/ communication services, but a substantial deficit for 
travel services. Observe that for maritime services, there are also large 
imports which are partly reflecting the substantial costs related to the 
shipping activity. Hence shipping leads to two-way trade in services, 
with freight charges one way and payment for local services (port 
fees, catering, repair, supply etc.) in the opposite direction. 
 On the bilateral pattern of trade, data availability is limited but 
improving. Services trade data should include consumption abroad 
(e.g. tourism) but it goes without saying that this is not easy to meas-
ure. It is therefore uncertain to what extent Mode 2 services trade is 
appropriately covered by the current data. Figure 5.3 shows Norway’s 
largest trade partners for services in 2007, based on the United Na-
tions Service Trade Statistics Database  
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/servicetrade/default.aspx).  
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Figure 5.3: Norway's 15 largest trade partners for services, 2007
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All the 15 largest trade partners in 2007 were OECD countries. Fur-
ther down the list we find some developing countries, but not too 
many. This is shown in greater detail in Appendix Table A1, where 
we show all the countries included in the UNSTAT data on bilateral 
total services trade for Norway. Here we find a few developing coun-
tries, including Brazil (0.28% of Norway’s services trade in 2007), 
China (0.16%) and India (0.11%). The small number of developing 
countries on the list may partly be due to data limitations, but never-
theless suggests that services trade is disproportionately concentrated 
on high-income countries and European trade partners. According to 
these data, Norway has no services trade with the LDCs.23 There may 
however be trade, e.g. related to tourism, that is not captured by the 
currently available data.  
 While China is already a giant in international merchandise 
trade, and India is by now famous for its accelerating services exports, 
                                                 
23  In Appendix Table A1 we have included an aggregate figure for Central and Southern 
Africa, where some exports are observed, but imports from this group are zero. 
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their shares in Norway’s service trade are minimal. This is shown in 
Figure 5.4, covering three of the “BRIC” countries (therefore named 
BIC). The diagram shows the shares of these countries in Norway’s 
imports of goods and services. 
 
Figure 5.4: BIC shares of Norway's imports in 2007, for 
goods and services
0.61
2.99
0.40.28 0.16 0.11
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Brazil China India
%
 o
f t
ot
al
 tr
ad
e
Goods
Services
 
 
This illustrates that Norway’s trade pattern in services mirrors what 
we also see in global services trade statistics: Exports are heavily 
dominated by high-income countries. This is particularly the case for 
skill-based services (see Chapter 4). Figure 5.4 may suggest that due 
to the smallness of the Norwegian market as well as proximity and 
integration with European countries, imports from developing coun-
tries are particularly limited.   
 
5.3. FDI and Norway’s services trade 
 
Norway’s FDI pattern broadly corresponds to the global pattern: 
There is a net outflow, and developing countries have a low share of 
inward but higher share of outward FDI. Services however have a 
slightly lower share of Norwegian FDI than for the world average. 
This is mainly due to the important role of FDI related to oil and gas, 
as shown in Figure 5.5.  
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Figure 5.5: Sector composition of Norway's inward and 
outward FDI, 2007
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The share for mining/extractive industries + manufacturing has re-
mained around 50% for inward as well as outward FDI during the last 
years. Hence the share for services is lower for Norway than for the 
world total. Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix show more detail. To a 
large extent, the pattern for FDI reflects the pattern for services trade: 
Financial and business services have a large share for inward FDI 
whereas transport services including shipping are important in out-
ward FDI. For maritime services, there is also significant inward FDI.  
 We do not have FDI data for Norway that are disaggregated by 
sectors and countries simultaneously, so we have to examine the coun-
try distribution only for aggregate FDI.24 With respect to countries, 
Norway’s FDI is even more strongly concentrated on the OECD than 
the world total. This is shown in Table 5.2. 
                                                 
24  Such data have not been published but could be constructed by Statistics Norway at some 
cost. For the purpose of this project, however, it was considered that such data would not 
be required. 
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Table 5.2: Norway’s FDI by main country groups 
Data source: Statistics Norway, online data bank www.ssb.no/di. 
(A) Figures in million NOK. 
Inward Outward 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 
OECD 277977 294531 329862 347940 314327 390904 456379 525190 
Offshore Fin. Centres 6095 6914 11615 18558 33593 42737 68411 74436 
Others -2083 -1783 4587 1542 63955 73233 105174 96412 
World 281989 299662 346064 368040 411875 506874 629964 696038 
(B) Shares of total (%) 
Inward Outward 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 
OECD 98.6 98.3 95.3 94.5 76.3 77.1 72.4 75.5 
Offshore Fin. Centres 2.2 2.3 3.4 5.0 8.2 8.4 10.9 10.7 
Others -0.7 -0.6 1.3 0.4 15.5 14.4 16.7 13.9 
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Almost all inward FDI is from the OECD, with a slight additional 
contribution from Offshore Financial Centres. For outward FDI, 
countries except OECD and Offshore Centres represented around 
15%. Hence some outward FDI is directed towards developing coun-
tries, but this is lower than the share of 24% for developing countries 
in world inward FDI (see Chapter 4). 
 For outward FDI, we even find a role for the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs). This is shown in Figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6: The LDC share of Norway's FDI stocks, 
1998-2007
Data source: Statistics Norway.
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From 1999 onwards, there have been substantial oil-related invest-
ments in Angola, which accounts for about 2/3 of the outward FDI 
stock in LDCs. The rest is mainly captured by Liberia, and this is pre-
sumably related to the shipping register of Liberia. This was also the 
reason why the inward FDI stock from LDCs increased somewhat in 
2005-2007 (the lower curve). Hence beyond the shipping activity in 
Liberia, there is little evidence of Norwegian services-related FDI in 
the LDCs. 
 
5.4. Temporary migration in services? 
 
Corresponding to Norway’s pattern of FDI, much of the Mode 4 trade 
of this type would be related to OECD countries, but with some out-
ward movement to developing countries related to investment in oil 
and gas, manufacturing and shipping. Given that inward FDI from de-
veloping countries to Norway is zero if we exclude the offshore cen-
tres, there will be little Mode 4 exports of this type from developing 
countries to Norway. There is certainly substantial movement of per-
sons related to trade, but not related to FDI. Given that Mode 4 ex-
ports from developing countries to Norway are limited, and probably 
close to zero for the LDCs, we have not attempted to provide more 
detailed statistical evidence on FDI-related temporary movements. 
 While the LDCs are mostly absent in Norway’s inward ser-
vices trade and FDI, they are strongly represented in the inward mi-
grant stock. As noted, migration is very different from Mode 4 trade 
but nevertheless may illuminate some aspects that are relevant for 
Mode 4. Figure 5.7 shows the share of various country groups in the 
Norwegian inward migrant stock (data source: OECD 2009). 
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Figure 5.7: Norway's inward migrant stock by origin, 1998 
and 2007
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Liberalising Mode 4 trade by allowing semi- and low-skilled workers, 
or allowing more seasonal work under the GATS for non-EEA coun-
tries, could potentially increase Mode 4 trade. This is however likely 
to be a controversial issue: In Norway, as elsewhere, immigration is 
strictly regulated and there are sharp political debates about current 
migration policies and trends.  
In Norway, migration is currently regulated by the new immi-
gration act adopted in 2009 and the accompanying regulation contain-
ing more specific rules (Ministry of Justice and the Police 2008, 
2009). The law as well as the regulation entered into force 1.1.2010. It 
is interesting that the law includes a “carve-out” with respect to inter-
national treaties in §23 (on workers hired by Norwegian firms) as well 
as §24 (individual service suppliers and staff of foreign services 
firms). While the normal precondition is a needs assessment; i.e. that 
it is impossible to obtain suitable workers from Norway or the EEA, 
this can be dispensed with if this follows from international treaties 
that Norway is part of. The individual needs assessment for non-EEA 
workers can also be dropped for particular categories of skilled labour 
delivering services (§24). For services delivery, the law also includes 
a parity condition for wage and working conditions; these should not 
be inferior to applicable wage agreements or what is normal for the 
relevant place and profession (§24). The law also allows quotas and 
group permissions for seasonal work (§23). Particular rules apply to 
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EEA citizens that have privileged access for services delivery and the 
labour market.  
Due to the carve-out provisions of the immigration act, the im-
pression is that the law is not an obstacle to improved Mode 4 market 
access. This would however be a political issue. 
 
5.5. On the potential impact of trade preferences for 
LDCs 
 
The analysis in this chapter has shown that Norway’s imports of ser-
vices from LDCs are close to or equal to zero, according to available 
services trade data as well as FDI statistics. There is some inward FDI 
related to Liberia and shipping, but this could hardly be a main target 
for new trade preferences. It could be the case that available trade sta-
tistics is underreporting, for example for tourism. For tourism, it is 
however not likely that import restrictions in Norway are the main 
impediments to more trade, so the scope for preferences is limited. As 
shown by Grosso et al. (2007), investment in tourism-linked sectors in 
LDCs would be important for developing tourism further, but this 
would hardly be influenced by preferences related to Norway’s GATS 
commitments. 
 When trade is zero, it cannot be scaled up or down in any trade 
model and this suggests that the short-term impact of services trade 
preferences for LDCs is likely to be limited. For Mode 4, it is less cer-
tain what the impact might be. During recent years, temporary migra-
tion from the EEA has increased considerably, for example for sea-
sonal labour in agriculture. In principle (see Chapter 6), Mode 4 could 
be implemented more widely to cover such seasonal labour and this 
could allow more Mode 4 trade.  
 The limited short-term impact of market access preferences 
suggests that other forms of SDT (Special and Differential Treatment) 
are more important than GSP-type discrimination, at least for Norway 
and in the shorter run. Aid to infrastructure, human capital formation, 
regulation and standardisation and other purpose could be used to 
promote the development of the services sectors in LDCs, and our 
analysis suggests that such measures could be more important than 
trade discrimination. 
 6. International Migration, the Least  
Developed Countries and the WTO 
 
Arne Melchior 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter provides a survey with some new evidence on aspects of 
international migration. While Mode 4 trade constitutes a very small 
share of international migration, this broader evidence sheds light on 
some aspects that are also relevant in the GATS context. 
 
 International migration, especially South-to-North migration of 
skilled labour has increased rapidly in recent decades and mi-
grants now constitute 9% of the population in the OECD. 44% of 
international migration is South-South. The poorest countries have 
lower emigration rates and for the LDCs, 61% of outward migra-
tion is to low-income countries. International migration and Mode 
4 in the GATS are therefore not North-South issues but global is-
sues. 
 Emigration of skilled labour contributes to a “brain drain” but in 
some cases, the prospect of emigration can lead to more invest-
ment in education and the net result may be a “brain gain”. This is 
more likely for large countries such as India, but for poor coun-
tries with limited skills the brain drain can be a real problem. In 
spite of this, some LDCs consider skilled emigration as a future 
prospect. For temporary migration, concerns for brain drain are 
less relevant.  
 According to current practice, GATS covers foreign individuals 
and foreign firms delivering services, but not foreigners employed 
by host country services firms. There is however some ambiguity 
in the GATS legal text and a future option is to allow the latter 
category and thereby recruitment of temporary workers by host 
country firms. If the LDCs are granted new special provisions in 
the GATS, one option is to extend the scope of GATS in this way 
only for the LDCs, in addition to providing more or deeper com-
mitments. 
 Temporary migration may easily become permanent and current 
regimes for temporary migration in the OECD are generally based 
on strict implementation regimes. These are in several cases based 
on bilateral cooperation where source countries also have respon-
sibility for screening, return and control. Mode 4 liberalisation 
without appropriate control regimes is likely to be an illusion, and 
a waiver should therefore extend flexibilities on implementation 
and allow bilateral arrangements.  
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6.1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, major international institutions have argued that large 
global welfare gains could be obtained by relaxing barriers to interna-
tional migration. The World Bank (2006, p. 34ff.) argued that in-
creased migration from developing to developed countries can lead to 
global welfare gains in the order of 350 billion USD or 0.6% of world 
GDP. About one half of the gains accrue to the 15 million new mi-
grants from poor to rich countries, who triple their income. Walmsley 
and Winters (2003) obtained comparable estimates, and argued that 
these could be obtained also by means of temporary migration.  
 The gains from migration are in line with what is to be ex-
pected from a neoclassical trade model with capital and labour: Coun-
tries can trade and obtain gains from specialisation, with labour-
abundant countries exporting the labour-intensive goods (such as 
clothing etc.) in exchange for imports of capital-intensive goods. But 
if countries are too different in terms of factor composition, they will 
specialise in different goods and no more reallocation of factor use 
can happen through trade. Beyond some point, there is nothing more 
to gain from trade specialisation. Through migration, however, further 
gains can be obtained. 
 In spite of the optimistic estimates, the political enthusiasm in 
rich countries is limited. Immigration is in most rich countries a con-
tentious political issue, involving a host of issues such as cultural 
identity, fiscal burdens, illegal immigration and workers’ rights. In 
this situation, some have argued that temporary migration is a solu-
tion: the gains from migration may be obtained without the burdens. 
According to Winters (2003, 60): “Unlike the concerns associated 
with the mass migration of less skilled workers, fears for cultural iden-
tity, problems of assimilation, and the drain on the public purse are 
hardly relevant for the temporary movement of natural persons. The 
biggest concern it raises is its competitive challenge to local less 
skilled workers. But this challenge is no more imposing than that pre-
sented to such workers by imports of labour-intensive goods from de-
veloping countries, which has been overcome by the weight of gains 
that such trade can deliver and by policies to easy adjustment …”.  
Furthermore, temporary migration avoids the brain drain problem, 
which could otherwise represent a problem, especially for small de-
veloping countries. 
 Supported by such arguments, developing countries in the 
WTO have intensified their demand that there should be liberalisation 
also for Mode 4 movement of labour beyond experts and intra-
company transferees related to FDI. Liberalisation of “the temporary 
movement of natural persons” (TMNP) for developing countries in 
general is however politically unrealistic even in the DDA, and from 
the proposals tabled so far it seems that a rather limited liberalisation 
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for skilled labour is what may be expected (see e.g. Adlung 2008). If a 
“waiver” is accepted that allows preferential treatment for LDCs 
(Least Developed Countries) in the field of services trade, an issue is 
whether such a waiver should be used to provide mode liberal access 
in Mode 4 exclusively for LDCs. This is indeed what the LDCs hope 
for; see documents in Appendix B.  
 As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, LDCs have limited sup-
ply capacity for many services sectors; especially those with higher 
skill requirements (financial services, telecom, business services etc.). 
Hence in these sectors, preferential market access for LDCs in rich 
countries may have modest impact. Tourism-related services consti-
tute an exception where LDCs are significant suppliers, but the future 
development of the services industries of the LDCs is not primarily 
hampered by import barriers in rich countries (see e.g. Honeck 2008, 
Grosso et al. 2006). While some such barriers exist, the main obstacle 
seems to be development of infrastructure and linked industries in the 
LDCs themselves, which can be promoted by better access to invest-
ment (Mode 3) in their own markets, and Aid-for-Trade related to in-
frastructure and tourism. Some scope surely exists for GSP-like mar-
ket access preferences for LDCs in rich countries, but the overall im-
pact, at least in Norway, will hardly be massive. 
 Given the limited potential impact of rich country preferences 
for LDCs in Modes 1-3 (cross-border trade, consumption abroad and 
commercial presence/ investment), the attention has turned to Mode 4. 
LDCs may supply unskilled labour to the rich countries. When asked 
about the potential impact of LDC preferences in services, the unam-
biguous answer from LDCs themselves is: Mode 4.  
Increased temporary movement from LDCs to developed 
countries raises a number of issues that are also relevant in the context 
of migration. For example, it is argued that the brain drain is primarily 
a problem for permanent migration, and with Mode 4 trade one may 
obtaining the gains while avoiding the brain drain problem. An ex-
amination of the brain drain issue, based on the migration literature 
and related evidence, is therefore relevant as a background for dis-
cussing measures in GATS. Similarly, potential Mode 4 liberalisation 
raises a number of control problems, for example that temporary mi-
grants may try to become permanent. Such problems are familiar in 
the migration context and a review is therefore useful also for the 
GATS context.  
 
6.2. Migration: Not only a North-South issue 
 
In the WTO context, migration is a North-South issue where develop-
ing countries are the “demandeurs”: Rich countries should allow tem-
porary migration from poor countries. In the context of an LDC 
waiver, the implicit expectation is that rich countries are the ones that 
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should grant better market access. Our first message is: Migration is 
not mainly a North-South issue. This is only 1/3 of the truth, and es-
pecially for the poorest countries, is may be grossly misleading. 
 Using the bilateral data matrix of migrant stocks in 226 coun-
tries at the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation 
and Poverty (Migration DRC, 2007) we aggregate migrant stocks by 
the income groups of the origin and destination countries. Income 
group classification is missing for some countries, and with these 
countries deleted we have a data matrix for 208 countries, covering 
167 million migrants in 2000. Table 6.1 shows the origin and destina-
tion income groups of these migrants, with absolute figures in millions 
and % of the world total. In the lower part of the table, we also show 
the allocation across destination income groups for the LDCs, the 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS, with two different definitions), 
and the group of landlocked developing countries.  
  
Table 6.1: The world migrant stock 2000, according to the income levels of ori-
gin and destination countries 
Source: Calculations based on Migration DRC (2007) 
(A) The number of migrants in millions 
Income level of destination coun-
try  
High Upper middle 
Lower 
middle Low 
All countries 
High 26 2 3 1 31 
Upper middle 16 1 2 1 19 
Lower middle 32 8 24 4 68 
Income level 
of sending 
country 
Low 14 5 8 21 48 
All countries 87 16 36 27 167 
(B) In % of the total world migrant stock 
Income level of destination country 
 High Upper middle 
Lower 
middle Low 
All countries 
High 15.3 1.1 1.6 0.7 18.8 
Upper middle 9.5 0.8 1.0 0.4 11.7 
Lower middle 19.2 5.0 14.2 2.5 40.9 
Income level 
of sending 
country 
Low 8.2 2.7 4.9 12.9 28.6 
All countries 52.2 9.7 21.7 16.5 100.0 
 
While the projected migrant stock in 2010 is 214 mill. persons (UNDP 
2009, 146), the countries used for calculations here cover 167 million 
in 2000, when the stock was 195 million. A migrant is a person living 
in a country and born abroad. Our data generally cover legal migration 
and in addition there is illegal migration, which varies strongly across 
countries and may represent between 10 and 60% of the reported 
stocks (World Bank 2006, 62). 
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 The table shows that slightly more than half of the world mi-
grant stock goes into high income countries. Observe that this is not 
only the OECD, but some Middle East and Asian high income coun-
tries are significant migration destinations. If we count Upper+Lower 
middle and Low income countries as developing countries and sum 
the figures in 6.1(B), we obtain Table 6.1(C). 
 
Table 6.1(C): International migration stocks 2000 between 
high income and other 
Destination  High income Other 
High income 15.3 3.5 Origin Other  36.9 44.3 
 
For trade and investment, a large share of the world total is between 
rich countries, but for migration the figure is much lower: Only 15% 
of world migrant stocks in 2000 were between high income countries. 
Only 37% of world migration in 2000 was from South to North, and 
the largest part (44%) was between developing countries.  
In spite of representing less than half of the total, South-North 
migration has recently been the most dynamic component (Lowell 
2007). People in rich countries do not often migrate to live in poorer 
places, so the share of migration from “High” to “Other” above is low. 
This is further illustrated in Table 6.2, which shows the allocation of 
migration across rows and columns in Table 6.1 above.  
 
Table 6.2: The distribution of world migrant stock 2000, by income groups 
Source: Calculations based on Migration DRC (2007) 
(A) Share of destinations by income groups 
Income level of destination country 
 High Upper middle 
Lower 
middle Low 
All countries 
High 81.4 6.1 8.7 3.8 100 
Upper middle 81.7 7.0 8.3 3.1 100 
Lower middle 46.9 12.2 34.8 6.2 100 
Income level 
of sending 
country 
Low 28.7 9.5 17.0 44.9 100 
All countries 52.2 9.7 21.7 16.5 100 
(B) Share of origin countries by income groups 
Income level of destination country 
 High Upper middle 
Lower 
middle Low 
All countries 
High 29.3 11.9 7.6 4.4 18.8 
Upper middle 18.2 8.5 4.4 2.2 11.7 
Lower middle 36.7 51.6 65.6 15.4 40.9 
Income level 
of sending 
country 
Low 15.7 28.0 22.4 78.1 28.6 
All countries 100 100 100 100 100 
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For upper middle and high income countries, more than 80% go to 
high income, but this share is lower for the poorer countries. Espe-
cially for low-income countries 45% go to other low-income coun-
tries. Hence for developing countries, a considerable part of migration 
goes to other developing countries. This also applies to LDCs. Table 
6.3 shows figures as in Table 6.2(A) for LDCs and some other groups 
of interest. 
 
 
Table 6.3: The share of destinations by income groups, for migrant stock 2000 from 
LDCs and other country groups 
Source: Calculations based on Migration DRC (2007) 
Income level of destination country 
Country group High Upper middle 
Lower 
middle Low 
All coun-
tries 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 18.2 6.7 14.5 60.6 100 
Small Island Dev. States (SIDS, def. 1) 84.8 4.4 5.2 5.7 100 
Small Island Dev. States (SIDS, def. 2) 84.9 3.6 5.0 6.6 100 
Landlocked developing countries 12.2 4.7 49.7 33.4 100 
 
Hence for the LDCs, 61% of outward migration is to low-income 
countries. Migration is not only economically motivated but also 
driven by wars, natural disasters etc. The cost of migration and the 
lack of skills may also be a reason why they more often migrate to 
other poor countries in the neighbourhood.  
 Observe also the strikingly different results for Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS), which also includes many LDCs.25 These 
results show that for the SIDS, a very high share of migration is for 
high-income countries. For a number of Pacific Islands, the USA or 
Australia is the main migration target.  
 Worldwide migration is highly restricted and one might argue 
that if regimes had been more liberal, a higher share of poor country 
migration would go to rich countries. This contains some truth, but 
immigration restrictions also exist in poor countries. Hence the pattern 
observed in Tables 6.1-6.3 is not only a matter of restrictions, but it 
also reflects other aspects. In particular, geographical distance plays 
an important role, as shown by several studies (see e.g. Letouzé et al. 
2009). Migration declines strongly with distance between the origin 
and destination. This may have various explanations: The most obvi-
ous is that transaction costs are larger for migrating over larger dis-
tances. Transaction costs may also be lower due to language or cul-
tural and institutional similarity; it is easier to adapt in your neighbour 
country than in a remote country with a different language and culture. 
                                                 
25  For SIDS, no unambiguous definition exists so we have used two alternative definitions, 
with similar results in both cases. For more about SIDS definition, see 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3620&lang=1, or  
http://www.unohrlls.org/.  
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Finally, there may also be a “clustering” phenomenon since rich coun-
tries are more often than not located close to other rich countries, and 
the same applies to the poor. Hence geographical distance may also 
reflect economic similarity, for example that sector composition and 
skill requirements are more similar. 
 An illustration of this proximity factor in migration is Bangla-
desh. Due to being formerly a part of India, but also due to geographi-
cal proximity, the bulk of the Bangladesh outward migrant stock is in 
India. This is frequently not even included in analyses of international 
migration for Bangladesh (see e.g. Siddiqui 2003). According to our 
data set, the outward migration stock of Bangladesh in 2000 was 6.8 
millions. The ten largest destinations, accounting for 94% of the total, 
are shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Bangladesh - the largest 
emigration targets in 2000
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Hence almost 80% of Bangladesh’s outward stock was in India and 
Pakistan, the neighbour country Nepal is also high on the list. Rich 
countries (UK, USA, Germany) as well as Middle East countries 
(Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan) were important destinations, although 
much smaller than India and Pakistan. Although not seen from the 
diagram, countries in South East Asia (e.g. Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore) are also developing as destinations. The situation for 
Bangladesh is somewhat special since it was in the larger India jointly 
with Pakistan after independence. But also for other LDCs, we can 
find a prominence of neighbour countries among the target destina-
tions. As shown in Diagram 6.2, for Rwanda, 75% of migration stock 
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in 2000 was in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. In Africa, there was sig-
nificant long-distance migration only from a limited number of coun-
tries; in terms of absolute numbers the largest are South Africa, Soma-
lia and Senegal (mainly to Europe); Ethiopia (mainly to the USA); and 
Nigeria and Ghana (split between the two) (Black 2004, see also 
Black et al. 2004a,b). While the average share of remote emigration 
for poor countries is low, we have already seen that exceptions are 
found among island states. There are also other cases, for example due 
to history and colonial ties. For example, 77% of Cambodia’s migrant 
stock was in USA, France, Australia and Canada.  
 This “static” picture of migration stocks clearly demonstrates 
that for the poor countries, and especially the LDCs, a large share of 
migration is to other developing countries. A policy implication is that 
preferential market access for LDCs is not an issue only for rich, but 
also for developing countries. It does not weaken the case for better 
market access in rich countries, but it shows that many of the concerns 
related to migration in poor countries are of a South-South nature. For 
example, UNDP (2009) draws attention to the need for improvement 
in the living and working conditions of migrants.  
 
6.3. Characteristics of South-North migration:  
The migration ‘‘hump’’  
 
For policy purposes, an important issue whether trade preferences for 
the poorest are economically efficient and stimulate trade, or whether 
the supply capacity of poor countries is too limited. In Chapters 4 and 
5, we have seen that for cross-border trade and FDI, the supply capac-
ity of LDCs is limited, at least for many services sectors. Some evi-
dence suggests that a similar phenomenon is present for migration: 
The very poorest do not have the resources to migrate, so it is the sec-
ond poorest that actually do so. Hence also for migration, there may 
be a threshold that limits the impact of better access to migration for 
the poor. 
As a first illustration of this phenomenon, Table 6.4 expresses 
outward and inward migrant stocks in % of the total population of the 
four income groups. For LDCs, SIDs and landlocked developing 
countries we have calculated the shares only for the outbound stock. 
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Table 6.4: Outward and inward migrant stocks as % of the total popu-
lation for different country groups, 2000 
 
Country group Outward Inward 
High 3.3 9.0 
Upper middle 5.9 4.9 
Lower middle 2.6 1.4 Income group 
Low 2.1 1.2 
World 2.7 2.7 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 3.6 
Small Island Dev. States (SIDS, def. 1) 12.3 
Small Island Dev. States (SIDS, def. 2) 16.0 
Landlocked developing countries 6.0 
Not calculated
 
There is net inward migration in rich countries, and net outward mi-
gration for developing countries. The share of inward migration 
clearly increases by income level; supporting the expectation that mi-
gration is at least partly driven by economic motives. 
 For the outward shares, however, the share is highest in the 
upper middle income countries and not the low-income. Hence the 
migration rate is not highest where the income gap is largest, but in 
the intermediate range. This is a first illustration of what has been 
called the “migration hump” in the research literature: The emigration 
rate seems to increase up to some income level and then fall. For ex-
ample, Letouzé et al. (2009) find a threshold income around 13-14000 
USD per capita beyond which the emigration rate tends to fall.  
 The falling part of this curve is easy to explain: When the in-
come gap is reduced, the incentive to emigrate is lowered, so as coun-
tries get richer, their population become more satisfied and stops emi-
grating. But why does the migration curve increase at low income lev-
els? The standard explanation offered is that the transaction cost of 
migration is so high that the really poor people cannot afford to mi-
grate. According to de Haas (2007, 832) “The poorest tend to migrate 
less than those who are slightly better off. This seems particularly true 
for the relatively costly and risky international migration …. in order 
to migrate, people need the human, financial and social resources as 
well as the aspiration to do so.”  
A pitfall in the analysis of the “migration hump” is that we 
should control also for characteristics of receiving countries. In par-
ticular, migration is high from middle-income countries that are lo-
cated close to rich destination countries. For example, North African 
middle-income countries have more migration to Europe than poor 
African countries further south, and this may be due to proximity to 
Europe rather than their higher income level. As noted by Hanson 
(2008, 7): “Countries with the highest emigration rates tend to be 
small, poor countries close to the US.” When controlling for distance 
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and destination country characteristics in their regression analysis, Le-
touzé et al. (2009) found that the “hump” result became gradually 
weaker.  
The statistical analysis of “hump” issue is also complicated by 
the presence of many “outliers” or “untypical observations”. This is 
seen from Figure 6.3 where we plot the outward migrant stock as % of 
population (vertical axis) against income per capita.26  
 
Figure 6.3: Outward migration vs. income level, 
2000
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With the outliers included, there is apparently a maximum level at 12-
14.000$, but if we drop the outliers the maximum would be lower. 
The figure nevertheless supports the idea that for the very poorest 
countries, the emigration rate is low.  
While there is some uncertainty about the robustness and the 
implications of the “hump” phenomenon, it seems clear that the ex-
planation of de Haas is supported at the micro level: Even for un-
skilled migration, it is not the poorest that migrate, but intermediate 
workers. Hanson (2008) presents evidence on the “positive sorting” in 
international migration; it is generally not the least educated that 
leave. For example, Mexican emigrants tend to come from the middle 
of the skill distribution (ibid., 21). 
While there is an inverse hump for countries of origin, a simi-
lar phenomenon is not evident for destination countries. In Figure 6.4 
we plot the inward migrant stock as % of population (vertical axis) 
against income per capita. The graph covers 178 countries in 2005, 
based on data from the World Development Indicators. In figure 6.5 
                                                 
26  Migration data is also here from Migration DRC (2007), and income and population data 
are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
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we show a similar relationship using net migration rates (net migrant 
stock as % of the population). 
 
Figure 6.4: Inward migrants as % of population vs. 
income level, 2005
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Figure 6.5: Net migration rate vs. income, 2005
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Hence for inward migration there is a more or less monotonous and 
significant positive relationship: the richer you are, the higher is im-
migration. The regression line explains 45% of the variation in the 
data in Figure 6.4, and 32% in 6.5. The remaining 55% or 68% may 
be explained by immigration policies, geographical location, history 
and other features.  Hence there is considerable room for other influ-
encing factors, but income gaps constitute a main driving force.  
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Outcomes also vary depending on immigration policy as well 
as history and geography. A further illustration of this is Figure 6.6 
which, based on OECD data, shows migrant stocks as % of the popu-
lation for selected OECD countries in 1999 and 2007. The selection is 
based on data availability. 
 
Figure 6.6: Foreign-born persons as % of the population, for 
selected OECD countries
(Based on OECD: International Migration Outlook 2009)
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Among these 20 OECD countries, the migrant share varied from 4 to 
36%. In all cases there was an increase from 1999 to 2007. Hence 
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globalisation has not only led to more trade and investment, but also a 
significant increase in migration. For Europe, the international migrant 
stock increased from 16 to 64 millions from 1975 to 2005, with the 
strongest increase during the period 1985-1995 when the inward mi-
grant stock trebled (Lowell 2007). Norway was in 2007 close to the 
OECD average, with a migrant share at 9.5%. In Chapter 5, the com-
position of Norway’s inward migrant stock is also described. 
  
6.4. Skilled migration and the brain drain 
 
A general worry about South-North migration is that only skilled la-
bour migrate and that they “drain” the developing countries of valu-
able skills. It may be argued that this problem does not apply to Mode 
4 since it is temporary. This is however not fully convincing since 
Mode 4 may support “circular” or repeated migration that has more in 
common with permanent migration. Furthermore, there may be a con-
trol problem so that temporary workers try to become permanent. 
Temporary migration can also increase knowledge about the destina-
tion country and thereby also facilitate attempts to migrate perma-
nently. The evidence on brain drain is therefore indirectly relevant.  
Skilled migration has recently been the most dynamic element of 
international migration. From 1990 to 2000, skilled inward migration 
in the OECD increased by 64% whereas unskilled migration increased 
by only 14% (Docquier and Marfouk 2006, Docquier and Rapoport 
2008, Beine et al. 2008). This has been influenced by several factors, 
including  globalisation and multinational companies; a larger supply 
of skilled labour in some developing countries such as India; and de-
liberate policies in various countries to attract skilled labour.  
There is considerable variation in the rate of skilled to un-
skilled migrants across origin as well as destination countries. Some 
destination countries have immigration policies that make is easier for 
the skilled to enter. For example, the USA has facilitated the entry of 
skilled labour through the so-called H1B visas, and only in 2001 more 
than 160 000 Indian specialists were allowed to immigrate (Nielson 
and Cattaneo 2003). Table 6.5 shows the share with tertiary education 
in the inward migrant stock of the OECD in 1990 and 2000, based on 
Lowell (2007): 
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Table 6.5: The share of inward migrants with tertiary 
education, for OECD countries (including intra-OECD mi-
gration) 
 1990 2000 
Total 30 35 
Europe 26 32 
North America 47 58 
Latin America and Caribbean 27 26 
Asia  40 47 
Oceania 40 45 
Africa 22 31 
 
The share with tertiary education in the world migrant stock increased 
from 30% in 1990 to 35% in 2000. For the outward migration from 
Africa, it increased from 22 to 31%. The emigration rate was higher 
for skilled labour; for example Lowell (2007) shows that for LDCs the 
emigration rate in 2000 was around 1% for the whole population and 
above 10% for the skilled.27 
 According to the state-of-the-art conclusion in the current re-
search literature, brain drain is a problem in some cases, but not all. 
Countries such as India have a large pool of educated labour and can 
send some hundred thousands abroad without the country collapsing. 
Furthermore, the option of migration may increase the incentive for 
higher education so the net result may be a “brain gain” rather than a 
brain drain (see e.g. Mountford 1997). Beine et al. (2008, 2009) con-
firm that skilled emigration prospects promote human capital forma-
tion in the origin countries, and thereby provide some support for the 
brain gain hypothesis. The outcome is however mixed and depends on 
country characteristics. The authors conclude “We find that most 
countries combining low levels of human capital and low migration 
rates for skilled workers end up with a positive net effect. In contrast, 
the brain drain appears to have negative effects where the migration 
rate of the highly educated is above 20% and/or the proportion of peo-
ple with higher education is above 5%. There appears to be more los-
ers than winners and, in addition the former incur relatively high 
losses. However, the gain of the latter dominates in absolute terms, 
resulting in an overall gain for developing countries” (Beine et al. 
2008, 632). Docquier and Rapoport (2004, 2008) conclude that the 
optimal emigration rate for developing countries is positive, but ac-
cording to an inverse U-shaped curve so the poorest countries should 
have a lower emigration rate. Also for the brain drain, we have a 
“hump” that has important policy implications: Unfettered skilled 
emigration from small and poor countries may not be good for devel-
opment. 
                                                 
27  The result was based don Defoort (2006). 
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 Hence while India may gain due to its large pool of skilled la-
bour, other developing countries may not be so lucky and their loss of 
skills can be costly and damaging. Frequently mentioned examples are 
related to the emigration of health personnel from developing coun-
tries, and several examples are mentioned in Chanda (2001) (accord-
ing to her analysis, also Indian doctors constituted a problem). For In-
dia, 63% of the total migrant stock in six large OECD countries had 
tertiary education.28 
 Hence on South-North skilled migration, brain drain is selec-
tively a problem but cases of brain gain also exist. Many LDCs have 
high rates of skilled emigration (Docquier and Marfouk 2006, Varma 
2009) and according to this they would be in the problem area with 
respect to brain drain. Evidence also exists on detrimental brain drain 
in some African LDCs (Varma 2009). When interviewing LDC repre-
sentatives, however, a surprising impression was that temporary mi-
gration of skilled labour was also considered as a positive prospect. It 
is hard to say whether this is also affected by political realism, since 
immigration policies in the OECD are more restrictive for unskilled 
labour. But even today, some LDCs had a significant share of skilled 
labour in their outward migrant stock. For example, in 2000 Bangla-
desh had a share of 37.5% among their emigrants to six OECD coun-
tries. In Asia, several countries openly encourage emigration of skilled 
labour (World Bank 2006, 68). Among LDCs in Africa, there are dif-
ferent attitudes to emigration and Rwanda is an example of a country 
that aims at becoming a migration hub in the region (Varma 2009). 
But the evidence on the home country impact of skilled migration is 
nevertheless mixed, and e.g. the World Bank (2006, 68) concluded 
that an aggregate, reliable estimate of the impact of such migration is 
impossible to give. As noted by Varma (2009), skilled emigration 
could be implemented as part of programs for human capital forma-
tion in LDCs and not as an end in itself. 
 
6.5. Remittances 
 
For some developing countries, brain drain is a minus on the scorecard 
of emigration. On the positive side, there are remittances which are, 
taken together, more than twice the size of international aid flows 
(World Bank 2006). Remittances are the largest gain from migration 
to the origin countries. Table 6.6 shows remittances paid and received 
for the world and major income groups in 2008, in billion current 
USD and % of aggregate GDP.29   
 
 
                                                 
28  Calculated from the data set World Bank (2009). This is also the source for the Bangla-
desh figure below. 
29  Data source: World Development Indicators online. The variable definition is “Workers’ 
remittances and compensation of employees, current US$”.  
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Table 6.6: The magnitude of remittances 
 In billion current USD In % of GDP for group 
 Paid Received Net Paid Received Net 
High income 211 105 -106 0.49 0.24 -0.24 
Middle income 63 297 234 0.37 1.76 1.39 
Low income 2 31 28 0.41 5.41 5.00 
LDCs 3 21 19 0.48 3.85 3.37 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 20 16 0.38 2.01 1.62 
World 276 433 157 0.46 0.71 0.26 
 
There is a net outflow from high income countries, and a net inflow 
into developing countries. According to World Bank (2006, ix), 
South-South remittances make up 30-45% of inward flows in develop-
ing countries. For the LDCs, net inflows amounted to 3.4% of GDP 
which is a significant share. For individual countries, this may some-
times be even higher. This is evident from Figure 6.7, which shows 
inward remittances as a share of GDP plotted against income levels, 
for 158 countries in 2005.30 
 
Figure 6.7: Remittances as % of GDP, 2005
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For a number of poor countries, remittances constitute a significant 
share of GDP. 
 This concludes our overview of migration. The evidence pre-
sented does not cover the whole range of issues related to migration. 
Remittances are but one element in the overall calculation that deter-
mines whether migration is beneficial or not for a country as a whole. 
What is evident from the literature is that the largest gains from migra-
tion accrue to the migrants themselves and their families.  Statements 
                                                 
30  Data source: World Development Indicators, online data. 
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on other effects, for example on labour markets, fiscal balances, brain 
drain, culture and other aspects, are often exaggerated due to the po-
litical sensitivity of the migration issue. The evidence on these addi-
tional issues is however often mixed and unambiguous conclusions 
are hard to make. For a discussion, see Gordon (2008). 
 
6.6. Migration and the GATS:  
The definition of Mode 4 
 
Mode 4 of GATS only covers a small fraction of global migration; 
temporary migration related to services. Given the political controver-
sies about migration, temporary migration has been suggested as a 
remedy that gives the gains without the costs. For example, there 
would be no brain drain since workers will return back, and the labour 
market impact as well as the fiscal impact would likely be more lim-
ited. On the other hand there could also be some down sides; for ex-
ample that the transaction cost of moving could be larger relative to 
the pay, and that learning and adaptation would be more limited. Both 
these aspects – the cost calculation and the adaptation problem – also 
limit the scope for temporary migration: The net gain for long-
distance migrants may be small if the work period is short, and em-
ployers would not hire people who need time to learn how to do the 
job. For such reasons, temporary migration is different from migration 
in general.  Examples of temporary migration are: 
 
- Temporary  movement of staff within multinational companies; 
which has become much more common due to globalisation and 
the increased role for multinationals. 
- Temporary services jobs abroad, e.g. in business services (ac-
counting, consulting, installation, repair etc.).  
- Seasonal work, for example in agriculture.  
- Temporary stays to undertake particular business tasks; e.g. related 
to sales.  
 
The observed increase in temporary migration is partly due to politics: 
countries do not want permanent immigration and instead opt for the 
“light version” of temporary visas. According to the World Bank 
(2006, 72), skilled temporary migration has been stimulated by unilat-
eral visa programs such as the H1B visas in the USA, while unskilled 
temporary migration has more often been allowed in bilateral or re-
gional agreements. In the GATS, actual Mode 4 commitments have 
often been linked to Mode 3 (commercial presence), in order to facili-
tate the cross-border movement of staff involved in the foreign affili-
ate. For evidence on temporary migration; see e.g. Nielson and Catta-
neo (2003). 
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 The definition of GATS’ coverage is important and to some 
extent disputed (for a discussion, see Carzaniga 2008): 
 
1) First, it relates to “natural persons who are service suppliers of a 
Member, and natural persons of a Member who are employed by a 
service supplier of a Member”. 
2) Second, GATS does not apply to “measures affecting natural per-
sons seeking access to the employment market of a Member, nor 
shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, residence or em-
ployment on a permanent basis.”31 
 
A natural or “physical” person distinguishes the service supplier from 
a judicial person; hence GATS only covers the cases where the person 
moves abroad. In order to illustrate the definition, we use the exam-
ples of various service suppliers shown in Table 6.7, in all cases as-
suming that the natural person is from country A, that service is deliv-
ered in country B, and that the stay for this purpose is temporary: 
 
Table 6.7: Cases to illustrate the coverage of GATS 
Note: The natural person is living in country A, and the service is deliv-
ered in country B. 
Case 
No. Service 
Employment status of 
the natural person 
Covered by 
GATS 
1 Auditing of an account Individual Yes 
2 Auditing of an account In firm from A Yes 
3 Auditing of an account In firm from B No (?) 
 
Cases 1 and 2, where the product as such (accounting) is undeniably a 
service, and the supplier is an individual or an employee in a firm 
from A, are clearly covered by GATS. Case 3, where the natural per-
son is employed by a firm in the host country, is less clear. Bullet 
point 1) above does not sort out the matter since the last term is “a 
Member” and not e.g. “that member” which would exclude the host 
country firm. However, we might resort to para 2 and define employ-
ment in the host country as a matter of “seeking access to the em-
ployment market”. Then case 3 in the table would also be excluded. 
This issue is however debated: For example, Self and Zutshi (2003, 
34) consider the history of GATS negotiations and state that “The is-
sue of employment of foreigners by local firms apparently did not 
come up for detailed examination, because it was understood that ac-
cess to the labour market was outside the scope of the coverage under 
the GATS. The negotiating history of this issue is less clear, and the 
descriptive language that emerged for mode 4 is ambiguous … a 
sound case could be made in favour of multilateralization of such re-
                                                 
31  The quotes are from the GATS “Annex on movement of natural persons supplying ser-
vices to the Agreement”, see www.wto.org. 
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cruitment from foreign sources. Participants in the current negotia-
tions should explore this avenue for further liberalization under Mode 
4.” It should be added that in practice, the current WTO practice is not 
fully consequent. For example, the USA has bound in GATS its H1B 
scheme but this seems to involve migration of type 3 above. 
 In Table 6.7, the product delivered is clearly a service. An is-
sue is whether the interpretation is the same if the product is a labour 
service to producing a good. For example, firms in origin countries 
could deliver “fruit-picking services” to agriculture, or part of any 
production process for physical goods. In principle, this is still ser-
vices delivery and in principle it could be considered as cases 1-3 
above. The definition of “Other business services” in the current 
GATS classification lists (WTO 1991) is quite wide and seems to al-
low these types of services. Since commitments are made on a sec-
tor/mode basis, it is nevertheless up to WTO members to decide how 
wide the definition should be. 
 According to current practice, it seems justified to interpret 
“access to the employment market” as excluding case 3 (see also Car-
zaniga 2008). On the other hand, some ambiguity exists and if WTO 
members agree, it would be possible to allow case 3. This would be 
meeting the recently expressed wishes of the UNDP:  While the Hu-
man Development Report 2009 (UNDP 2009) does not advocate 
“wholesale liberalisation” for migration (p. 17), it suggests selective 
steps such as expanding schemes for seasonal work in e.g. agriculture 
and tourism, and better access for low-skilled migration (ibid., p. 4 
and p. 96ff.). Allowing foreign recruitment to domestic firms, as in 
case 3, and allowing a wide definition of what services are included, 
would facilitate temporary migration.  
 
6.7. A waiver for the LDCs in GATS: More Mode 4 access? 
 
If a waiver is granted that allows discriminatory treatment in favour of 
LDCs, it may also be used to facilitate Mode 4 movements. This could 
be done in various forms: 
 
- Access for LDCs could be provided for additional categories of 
skilled workers, as an extension of current GATS practice. There 
is a risk that such measures would have limited impact, given the 
limited supply of skill-based services. Some LDCs nevertheless 
see skilled emigration as a future prospect so this approach could 
be excluded. 
- If access is given for less skilled labour categories, the potential 
would partly depend on how such measures are implemented. A 
radical approach would be to allow migration as in case 3 above. 
This would allow systematic recruitment of temporary migrants, 
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and increase the potential for such migration. If access is provided 
for  
- A waiver could be used to differentiate with respect to duration 
and possible re-entry of migrants. In the GATS, temporariness is 
not precisely defined but in practice, business visitors are often al-
lowed 3 months of stay whereas intra-firm transfers are allowed 
for longer periods – up to 5 years in some cases. This is also a di-
mension where an extended preference is technically feasible. 
 
For any commitment under Mode 4, a number of implementation and 
legal issues would have to be considered. On implementation, an issue 
is how to make sure that migration is temporary and not permanent. 
Various solutions have been considered in bilateral arrangements, 
such as deferring the payment to workers until they return, or requir-
ing a bond for employing firms that is forfeited if workers do not re-
turn. Some examples of temporary guest worker regimes are discussed 
in Chanda (2009, on Spain-Ecuador and Canada-Mexico) and Schiff 
(2008, reviews several others). Such regimes are often highly detailed, 
they often involve bilateral cooperation, and arrangements on working 
conditions, possibly extension provisions, and rules for entry and exit. 
There are also cases where incentives are used to promote temporari-
ness; e.g. that later extension or new visas are more likely for those 
who return on time. Schiff (2008) includes a theoretical analysis of 
various arrangements, and concludes that arrangements with foreign 
firms rather than individuals are better since they provide incentives to 
keep the defection rate low. 
 Given that implementation of temporary migration is often 
supported by bilateral cooperation, an issue is whether a waiver for 
LDCs would require that any arrangement would be made for all the 
LDCs jointly, or whether special arrangements are allowed for indi-
vidual countries. Given that LDCs count about 800 million inhabi-
tants, Mode 4 access without appropriate controls will not be politi-
cally accepted. Concerning Mode 4 access granted in the DDA, vari-
ous authors have argued for implementation arrangements that involve 
bilateral cooperation and source country responsibilities (see e.g. 
Chaudhuri et al. 2004, Mattoo 2005). For example, countries that are 
to benefit of improved market access may have to accept, screening 
and to combat illegal migration (Mattoo 2005). Such bilateral imple-
mentation arrangements could also be allowed under a waiver, in or-
der to make Mode 4 access politically feasible. GATS Article V(bis) 
allows bilateral labour market integration agreements but it is uncer-
tain whether this would provide a basis for bilateral implementation 
arrangements. For this reason, it might be considered to include lan-
guage on this in a waiver as well. 
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 Appendix Table A1: Norway’s bilateral trade in services in 2007. 
Services trade in million USD In % of total with the world Country Exports Imports Trade Exports Imports Trade 
USA 11279 6047 17326 27.84 15.25 21.61
United Kingdom 7723 6254 13977 19.06 15.77 17.43
Sweden 4215 5947 10162 10.40 15.00 12.68
Denmark 2632 3594 6226 6.50 9.06 7.77
Germany 3127 2204 5330 7.72 5.56 6.65
Spain 381 3385 3766 0.94 8.54 4.70
Belgium 1414 1782 3196 3.49 4.49 3.99
France 1179 1893 3071 2.91 4.77 3.83
Netherlands 1159 1139 2299 2.86 2.87 2.87
Switzerland 1054 624 1678 2.60 1.57 2.09
Italy 494 1109 1603 1.22 2.80 2.00
Japan 820 350 1170 2.02 0.88 1.46
Finland 866 294 1160 2.14 0.74 1.45
Greece 170 935 1105 0.42 2.36 1.38
Canada 556 410 967 1.37 1.03 1.21
Australia 403 315 717 0.99 0.79 0.89
Hong Kong 195 201 396 0.48 0.51 0.49
Ireland 154 239 392 0.38 0.60 0.49
Turkey 4 261 265 0.01 0.66 0.33
Portugal 89 170 259 0.22 0.43 0.32
Austria 181 72 253 0.45 0.18 0.32
Poland 64 168 232 0.16 0.42 0.29
Brazil 141 83 224 0.35 0.21 0.28
Central and 
Southern Africa 179 0 179 0.44 0.00 0.22
Luxembourg 138 37 175 0.34 0.09 0.22
China 41 88 129 0.10 0.22 0.16
Iceland 58 49 106 0.14 0.12 0.13
Slovenia 8 95 103 0.02 0.24 0.13
India 36 51 87 0.09 0.13 0.11
Cyprus 40 43 83 0.10 0.11 0.10
Russian Fed. 17 52 70 0.04 0.13 0.09
New Zealand 37 24 61 0.09 0.06 0.08
Hungary 17 23 41 0.04 0.06 0.05
Latvia 16 24 40 0.04 0.06 0.05
Estonia 19 19 38 0.05 0.05 0.05
Liechtenstein 30 4 34 0.07 0.01 0.04
Czech Republic 19 14 33 0.05 0.03 0.04
Lithuania 13 14 27 0.03 0.03 0.03
Slovakia 19 6 25 0.05 0.02 0.03
Malta 19 2 20 0.05 0.00 0.03
World 40514 39654 80167 100 100 100
Data source: United Nations Service Trade Statistics Database.  
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Appendix Table A2: Norway’s FDI in 2004-2007 by sector 
Date source: Statistics Norway, www.ssb.no/di Tables 1 and 2. 
(A) Figures in million NOK. 
 Inward FDI Outward FDI 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Mining and extractive industries 110987 135442 149122 182827 106201 170602 221474 177549 
Manufacturing 130261 137911 145875 143620 143979 191660 162253 187225 
Construction 4280 4177 4788 4611 789 1352 2206 1436 
Trade, hotels and restaurants 60648 61413 63165 56094 20506 16814 19704 23141 
Transport and communication 49244 47219 55787 52330 68210 79345 132561 130955 
Financial, real estate and business services 90855 95047 131794 160736 52166 56805 71472 95996 
Other 33272 35491 48477 57722 96976 112511 144400 157604 
         
Sum 479547 516700 599008 657940 488827 629089 754070 773906 
(B) Shares in % of total 
 Inward Outward 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Mining and extractive industries 23.14 26.21 24.89 27.79 21.73 27.12 29.37 22.94 
Manufacturing 27.16 26.69 24.35 21.83 29.45 30.47 21.52 24.19 
Construction 0.89 0.81 0.80 0.70 0.16 0.21 0.29 0.19 
Trade, hotels and restaurants 12.65 11.89 10.54 8.53 4.19 2.67 2.61 2.99 
Transport and communication 10.27 9.14 9.31 7.95 13.95 12.61 17.58 16.92 
Financial, real estate and business services 18.95 18.40 22.00 24.43 10.67 9.03 9.48 12.40 
Other 6.94 6.87 8.09 8.77 19.84 17.88 19.15 20.36 
         
Sum 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Of which: Mining + extractive + manufacturing 50.31 52.90 49.25 49.62 51.18 57.59 50.89 47.13 
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Appendix Table A3: Norway’s inward and outward FDI 2004-2007, with an alternative sector division. 
Data source: Statistics Norway, online data. 
Million NOK Shares of total sectors 45-93 Inward FDI 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 
45 Construction 2982 3205 3705 3767 2.14 2.28 2.20 2.03 
50 Trade and repair of motor vehicles, trade in fuels for motor vehicles 34211 34943 34307 32471 24.56 24.83 20.34 17.54 
55 Hotels and restaurants 843 651 1527 1831 0.61 0.46 0.91 0.99 
61 Maritime transport 15593 14240 22785 20689 11.19 10.12 13.51 11.17 
62 Air transport 13092 14325 15021 16444 9.40 10.18 8.91 8.88 
65 Financial services excluding insurance and pension funds 44185 47627 54667 62667 31.72 33.84 32.41 33.84 
70 Trade and management of real estate 27029 23864 35038 44658 19.40 16.95 20.77 24.12 
85 Health and social services 153 161 223 285 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.15 
92 Leisure activity, cultural services and sports 828 864 586 187 0.59 0.61 0.35 0.10 
93 Other personal services 394 872 814 2177 0.28 0.62 0.48 1.18 
94 Private purchase/sale of holiday houses and apartments 25526 26342 32349 40988     
         
Sum 45-93 139310 140752 168673 185176 100 100 100 100 
Million NOK Shares of total sectors 45-93 Outward FDI 2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 
45 Construction 337 730 1963 1213 0.29 0.63 1.07 0.58 
50 Trade and repair of motor vehicles, trade in fuels for motor vehicles 8108 9072 10302 12644 7.07 7.78 5.59 6.00 
55 Hotels and restaurants 368 521 164 297 0.32 0.45 0.09 0.14 
61 Maritime transport 23583 36589 48155 51414 20.57 31.39 26.14 24.38 
62 Air transport 39459 34107 77101 79023 34.41 29.26 41.85 37.48 
65 Financial services excluding insurance and pension funds 6315 8369 9963 23874 5.51 7.18 5.41 11.32 
70 Trade and management of real estate 32859 26932 36124 41981 28.66 23.11 19.61 19.91 
85 Health and social services 4 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
92 Leisure activity, cultural services and sports 283 273 503 353 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.17 
93 Other personal services 3350 -47 -49 62 2.92 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 
94 Private purchase/sale of holiday houses and apartments 71816 87830 116614 135144     
         
Sum 45-93 114666 116546 184226 210861 100 100 100 100 
 Table A4: All destinations for Norwegian outward FDI (stocks, 2007).  
Figures in million NOK. 
Rank Country 
Mill. 
NOK Rank Country 
Mill. 
NOK 
1 Sweden 103433 39 Estonia 932
2 Spain 66019 40 China 927
3 Singapore 57837 41 Libya 918
4 Belgium 56142 42 Serbia and Montenegro 833
5 Netherlands 54012 43 Czech Rep. 818
6 U S A 44560 44 Peru 760
7 Denmark 44117 45 Lithuania 745
8 UK 41460 46 Italy 646
9 Germany 33280 47 Malaysia 501
10 France 26679 48 Cayman Islands 438
11 Canada 19253 49 Hong Kong 376
12 Angola 16199 50 Vietnam 358
13 Russia 12650 51 Portugal 290
14 Algeria 10232 52 Luxembourg 288
15 Turkey 8758 53 Colombia 257
16 Bermuda 8329 54 United Arab Emirates  248
17 Azerbaijan 8053 55 Mexico 241
18 Pakistan 7647 56 Tanzania 233
19 Liberia 6544 57 Malta 218
20 Venezuela 6410 58 India 209
21 Ukraine 6226 59 Nepal 157
22 Brazil 6111 60 Argentina 153
23 Thailand 5830 61 Færøyene 111
24 Hungary 5147 62 Marocco 106
25 Finland 4750 63 Saudi Arabia 103
26 Cyprus 4133 64 Mauritius 87
27 Australia 2751 65 Panama 80
28 Austria 2624 66 Egypt 74
29 South Africa 2423 67 New Zealand 68
30 Chile 2118 68 Oman 66
31 Ireland 2093 69 Indonesia 54
32 South Korea 2093 70 Japan 54
33 Poland 1717 71 Sri Lanka 44
34 Latvia 1676 72 Bulgaria 37
35 Switzerland 1596 73 Philippines 28
36 Iran 1458 74 Croatia 26
37 Slovakia 1152 75 Taiwan 9
38 Iceland 1144 76 Greece 5
Data source: Statistics Norway, online data on www.ssb.no/di 
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B1: Common WTO text from 2003 on services and the LDCs 
  
WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 
 
TN/S/13 
5 September 2003 
 (03-4637) 
Council for Trade in Services  
Special Session 
 
 
 
 
MODALITIES FOR THE SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRY 
MEMBERS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
 
Adopted by the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services on 3 September 2003  
 
 
I. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 
1. In pursuance of the objectives of the GATS and as required by Article XIX:3 of the GATS 
special treatment for least-developed country Members (LDCs) shall be granted by providing special 
priority to LDCs in the implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article IV of the GATS.  Particular 
account shall be taken of the serious difficulty of LDCs in undertaking negotiated specific 
commitments in view of their special economic situation and their development, trade and financial 
needs. 
2. The importance of trade in services for LDCs goes beyond pure economic significance due to 
the major role services play for achieving social and development objectives and as a means of 
addressing poverty, upgrading welfare, improving universal availability and access to basic services, 
and in ensuring sustainable development, including its social dimension.  LDCs are facing serious 
difficulty in addressing a number of complex issues simultaneously, and lack institutional and human 
capacities to analyse and respond to offers and requests.  This should be factored into the negotiating 
process in general and regarding the individual requests made to LDCs. 
3. Together with the Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in Services 
(S/L/93), the Modalities for the Special Treatment for Least-Developed Country Members in the 
Negotiations on Trade in Services shall ensure maximum flexibility for LDCs and shall form the basis 
for the negotiations.  
II. SCOPE 
4. Members shall take into account the serious difficulty of LDCs in undertaking negotiated 
specific commitments in view of their special economic situation, and therefore shall exercise 
restraint in seeking commitments from LDCs. In particular, they shall generally not seek the removal 
of conditions which LDCs may attach when making access to their markets available to foreign 
service suppliers to the extent that those conditions are aimed at achieving the objectives of Article IV 
of the GATS.  
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5. There shall be flexibility for LDCs for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of 
transactions, and progressively extending market access in line with their development situation. 
LDCs shall not be expected to offer full national treatment, nor are they expected to undertake 
additional commitments under Article XVIII of the GATS on regulatory issues which may go beyond 
their institutional, regulatory, and administrative capacities. In response to requests, LDCs may make 
commitments compatible with their development, trade and financial needs and which are limited in 
terms of sectors, modes of supply and scope. 
6. Members shall, as provided for in Articles IV and XIX of the GATS, give special priority to 
providing effective market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to LDCs, through 
negotiated specific commitments pursuant to Parts III and IV of the GATS.  LDCs should indicate 
those sectors and modes of supply that represent priority in their development policies, so that 
Members take these priorities into account in the negotiations. 
7. Members shall work to develop appropriate mechanisms with a view to achieving full 
implementation of Article IV:3 of the GATS and facilitating effective access of LDCs' services and 
service suppliers to foreign markets. 
8. Members shall take measures, in accordance with their individual capacities, aimed at 
increasing the participation of LDCs in trade in services. Such measures could include: 
 strengthening programmes to promote investment in LDCs, with a view to building their domestic 
services capacity and enhancing their efficiency and export competitiveness;  
 reinforcing export/import promotion programmes;  
 promoting the development of LDCs' infrastructure and services exports through training, 
technology transfer, enterprise level actions and schemes, intergovernmental cooperation 
programmes, and where feasible, financial resources; and 
 improving the access of LDCs' services and service suppliers to distribution channels and 
information networks, especially in sectors and modes of supply of interest to LDCs. 
9. It is recognized that the temporary movement of natural persons supplying services (Mode 4) 
provides potential benefits to the sending and recipient Members. LDCs have indicated that this is one 
of the most important means of supplying services internationally. Members shall to the extent 
possible, and consistently with Article XIX of the GATS, consider undertaking commitments to 
provide access in mode 4, taking into account all categories of natural persons identified by LDCs in 
their requests. 
10. LDCs shall be granted appropriate credit for their autonomous trade liberalization. In 
addition, Members shall refrain from requesting credits from LDCs. 
11. In developing any multilateral rules and disciplines, including under GATS Articles VI:4 
(Domestic regulation), X (Emergency safeguard measures), XIII (Government procurement) and XV 
(Subsidies), Members shall take into account the specific interests and difficulties of LDCs. 
III. PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROVISION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WITH 
 REGARD TO TRADE IN SERVICES 
12. Targeted and coordinated technical assistance and capacity building programmes shall 
continue to be provided to LDCs in order to strengthen their domestic services capacity, build 
institutional and human capacity, and enable them to undertake appropriate regulatory reforms. In 
pursuance of Paragraph 14 of the Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in Services 
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(S/L/93), technical assistance shall also be provided to LDCs to carry out national assessments of 
trade in services in overall terms and on a sectoral basis with reference to the objectives of the GATS 
and Article IV in particular.  
IV. MECHANISMS AND PROCEDURES 
13. The Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services shall review, as necessary, the 
implementation of these modalities under the standing item on "Review of Progress in the 
Negotiations".  
14. In his report to the Trade Negotiations Committee, the Chairman of the Special Session of the 
Council for Trade in Services will include the issues raised by Members with regard to these 
modalities.  
 
__________ 
 
 
 B2. Relevant part of Annex C of the WTO Hong Kong dec-
laration of December 2004  
… achieve a progressively higher level of liberalization of trade in 
services, with appropriate flexibility for individual developing country 
Members, 
Page C-2 
3. Members shall pursue full and effective implementation of the 
Modalities for the Special Treatment for Least-Developed 
Country Members in the Negotiations on Trade in Services 
(LDC Modalities) adopted by the Special Session of the Coun-
cil for Trade in Services on 3 September 2003, with a view to 
the beneficial and meaningful integration of LDCs into the 
multilateral trading system. 
Page C-3 
9.  Members, in the course of negotiations, shall develop methods 
for the full and effective implementation of the LDC Modalities, 
including expeditiously: 
(a) Developing appropriate mechanisms for according special 
priority including to sectors and modes of supply of interest to 
LDCs in accordance with Article IV:3 of the GATS and para-
graph 7 of the LDC Modalities. 
(b) Undertaking commitments, to the extent possible, in such 
sectors and modes of supply identified, or to be identified, by 
LDCs that represent priority in their development policies in 
accordance with paragraphs 6 and 9 of the LDC Modalities. 
(c) Assisting LDCs to enable them to identify sectors and 
modes of supply that represent development priorities. 
(d) Providing targeted and effective technical assistance and 
capacity building for LDCs in accordance with the LDC Mo-
dalities, particularly paragraphs 8 and 12. 
(e) Developing a reporting mechanism to facilitate the review 
requirement in paragraph 13 of the LDC Modalities.  
10. Targeted technical assistance should be provided through, inter 
alia, the WTO Secretariat, with a view to enabling developing and 
least-developed countries to participate effectively in the negotiations. 
In particular and in accordance with paragraph 51 on Technical Coop-
eration of this Declaration, targeted technical assistance should be 
given to all developing countries allowing them to fully engage in the 
negotiation. In addition, such assistance should be provided on, inter 
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alia, compiling and analyzing statistical data on trade in services, as-
sessing interests in and gains from services trade, building regulatory 
capacity, particularly on those services sectors where liberalization is 
being undertaken by developing countries.  
  
  
B3: LDC communication from March 2006 
 
RESTRICTED WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 
TN/S/W/59 
28 March 2006 
 
 (06-1426) 
Council for Trade in Services  
Special Session 
Original:   English 
 
 
 
COMMUNICATION FROM THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA 
ON BEHALF OF THE LDC GROUP 
 
A Mechanism to Operationalize Article IV: 3 of the GATS  
 
 
 The following communication, dated 27 March 2006, was received from the delegation of the 
Republic of Zambia on behalf of the LDC group, with the request that it be circulated to Members of 
the Council for Trade in Services. 
 
_______________ 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
1. Article IV:3 of the GATS provides the mandate for granting special priority to LDCs by 
stating that "special priority shall be given to the least-developed country Members…" in the 
liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to them, among other 
things.  However, there is no mechanism through which this 'special priority' can be accorded to 
LDCs,1 which means that currently, any special treatment accorded to LDCs would have to be 
extended on an MFN basis in order to comply with the MFN obligation.  This would nullify the 
"special priority" clause, a consequence that is not contemplated in the GATS.2 
2. WTO Members are aware of this gap and they have expressly recognized this in paragraph 7 
of the LDC Modalities3 which provides that:  
"Members shall work to develop appropriate mechanisms with a 
view to achieving full implementation of Article IV:3 of the GATS 
                                                     
1 The GATT, on the other hand, has several preferential treatment mechanisms, for example: the 
Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries - Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903) (the Enabling Clause), which replaced the GSP Waiver - 
Decision of 25 June 1971 (BISD 18S/24); and the Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least Developed Countries 
(Waiver adopted on 15 June 1999) (WT/L/304). 
2 "One of the corollaries of the "general rule of interpretation" in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969) is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is 
not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy 
or inutility": United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB at p.23.  
This principle has been applied in many subsequent WTO cases: See Appellate Body Repertory of Reports and 
Awards 1994 – 2004 at www.wto.org.  
3 Modalities for the Special Treatment for Least-Developed Country Members in the Negotiations on 
Trade in Services (TN/S/13) – adopted by the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services on 
3 September 2003. 
TN/S/W/59 
Page 110 
 
 
  
and facilitating effective access of LDCs' services and service 
suppliers to foreign markets "(Emphasis added). 
3. Recently, paragraph 9 of Annex C of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration affirmed this 
provision by reiterating that Members shall expeditiously develop appropriate mechanisms for 
according special priority to sectors and modes of supply of interest to LDCs.  This is in line with 
paragraph 3 of Annex C of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration which says Members shall pursue 
full and effective implementation of the LDC Modalities with a view to the beneficial and meaningful 
integration of LDCs into the multilateral trading system. 
4. The mechanism for operationalising Article IV:3, that is, providing special priority to LDCs, 
has to be developed by Members.  The LDC Modalities have made this clear, as has Annex C of the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.  In addition, Annex C says that Members shall develop the 
mechanism within the course of the negotiations.  This implies that the mechanism should be adopted 
in the present negotiations, as part of the single undertaking, and within the stated deadlines.  
Paragraph 11(e) of Annex C substantiates this view because it states that Members shall strive to 
develop the mechanism by 31 July 2006. 
5. In light of the above, LDCs could propose the following mechanism for negotiation among 
and adoption by the Members: 
II. THE PROPOSED DRAFT TEXT OF THE MECHANISM 
Understanding on Article IV:3 of the GATS 
 
Members, 
 
Recognizing the low level of participation in world trade in services by the least developed countries, 
and the need to ensure their effective participation in the world trading system by taking further 
measures to improve their trading opportunities; 
 
Reaffirming the need for positive efforts to ensure that developing countries, especially the least 
developed among them, secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of 
their economic development;  
 
Recognizing that enhanced market access has an important role to play in ensuring that least-
developed countries secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their 
development; 
 
Noting that Article IV:3 of the GATS provides that special priority shall be given to least-developed 
countries;  
 
Recognizing that currently there is no operational mechanism for effectively implementing the 
provisions of Article IV:3; 
 
Considering that Paragraph 3 of Annex C of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration requires full and 
effective implementation of the LDCs Modalities as an objective of the negotiations; and that 
Paragraph 47 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration calls on Members to implement the 
Modalities for the Special Treatment for Least Developed Country Members in the Negotiations on 
Trade in Services and to give special priority to sectors and modes of supply of interest to least 
developed countries; 
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Considering also that Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the LDCs Modalities and Paragraph 9 of Annex C of the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration require Members to develop appropriate mechanisms with a view 
to achieving full implementation of GATS Article IV:3;  
 
Desiring to provide a mechanism to make Article IV:3 operational, consistent with the 
abovementioned LDCs Modalities and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration; 
 
Hereby agree as follows: 
 
1. Notwithstanding any provision of the GATS, non-reciprocal special priority shall be accorded 
only to least developed countries in sectors and modes of supply of interest to them.  
2. Developed country Members shall, and developing country Members declaring themselves in 
a position to do so should, accord non-reciprocal special priority to least developed countries. 
3. Any special priority provided under this Understanding: 
 shall be designed to facilitate and promote the exports of least developed countries; 
 shall be designed, and if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, 
financial and trade needs of least developed countries as identified by the least developed 
countries concerned; 
 shall be provided on a permanent basis and in a manner that ensures security, stability and 
predictability. 
 
4. Members providing special priority under this Understanding to least developed countries 
shall notify the Council for Trade in Services of the special priority that they are providing.  Based on 
such notifications and Members' Schedules of commitments, the Council for Trade in Services shall 
annually review the special priority that Members are providing to least developed countries with a 
view to ensuring that positive commitments are made in favor of LDCs. 
5. All least developed countries shall be treated as affected Members for the purposes of Article 
XXI when a Member modifies the special priority provided pursuant to this Understanding.  
Compensatory adjustments will be made only in favour of least developed countries.  
6. The dispute settlement provisions of the GATS and the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
may be invoked with respect to any matter arising from this Understanding. 
_________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 B4: WTO Council for Trade in Services, Chairman summary 
28 July 2008 
 
ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE 
SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS, WTO document TN/S/34, 28 July 2008 
(extract). 
 
 Members reaffirm their commitment to fulfil the requirements set 
out in paragraph 9(a) of Annex C of the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration regarding the development of appropriate mechanisms 
for according special priority including to sectors and modes of sup-
ply of interest to LDCs.  Members welcome the Note by the Secre-
tariat “Options to Implement the LDC Modalities” (JOB(08)/8).  Of 
the options identified in this paper, Members are of the view that a 
waiver, available to all Members, from the obligations of Article II, 
paragraph 1 of the GATS in respect of preferential treatment bene-
fiting all LDC Members offers the most satisfactory outcome of this 
negotiation. Members shall strive to complete negotiations on the 
specific principles and characteristics of such a waiver before the 
revised offers are submitted, in accordance with the sequence of the 
timelines set out in paragraph 11 (e) of Annex C of the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration. 
10. Members shall continue to give due consideration to proposals on 
trade-related concerns of small economies.  In recognizing their spe-
cial situation, further liberalization shall be in accordance with their 
development needs. 
11. Members shall complete the consideration of proposals on special 
and differential treatment, referred to the Special Session of the 
Council for Trade in Services by the Special Session of the Commit-
tee for Trade and Development, with a view to making clear rec-
ommendations for a decision by the General Council prior to the 
conclusion of the DDA negotiations. 
12. Members recognize the special situation of recently-acceded Mem-
bers who have undertaken extensive market access commitments at 
the time of accession.  This situation will be taken into account in 
the DDA negotiations. 
 
13. Members recall and reaffirm that targeted technical assistance as 
agreed in paragraph 10 of Annex C of the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration is intended to enable developing countries and LDCs to 
participate effectively in the negotiations.  In this regard, Members 
request the WTO Secretariat to prepare, prior to the submission of 
revised offers, a comprehensive report of technical assistance activi-
ties it has carried out in services since the Hong Kong Ministerial 
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Conference, to enable Members to identify further required activi-
ties, on the basis of which the Secretariat, in consultation with 
Members, could provide a roadmap for future efforts before the end 
of the negotiations. 
 Appendix C:  Fact sheets for trade in  
services 
 
Explanatory notes 
 
Data source: IMF Balance of Payment Statistics (as of September 
2009) 
 
Data coverage: The number of countries covered varies across vari-
ables and over time, and the number for the total and for LDCs are 
indicated on each fact sheet. For each country, 1990-2007 includes 18 
observations. Calculations for the country subgroups were first under-
taken (i) with all observations included; (ii) only for countries with 
full time series coverage; and (iii) for countries with maximum 5 years 
missing in the time series. Then it was considered which results had 
the best trade-off between consistency (constant sample over time); 
country coverage (number of countries included, in particular LDCs); 
and time-series coverage. In some cases alternative (iii) was used; and 
in some cases alternative (i); and in general some years were deleted 
from the fact sheet graphs when coverage was too limited or variation 
over time too large. We nevertheless allow some variations in the 
sample size over time in order to increase coverage, and the graphs 
should be interpreted with some caution due to this. Hence some fluc-
tuations over time may be caused by countries being added or dropped 
from the sample. This is the price we pay for better data coverage; us-
ing option (ii) above as a criterion would reduce the coverage of LDCs 
severely since data are often missing for individual years. 
 
Classification of sectors: See attached descriptions on the last pages. 
Observe that the IMF classification is not identical to the classification 
of services in CPC (see  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=25). The following 
sectors are covered: 
- Services, total 
- Transport services 
o Passenger transports 
o Freight transports 
- Travel services 
- Communication services 
- Construction services 
- Insurance 
- Financial services 
- Computer services 
- Royalties, license fees etc. 
- Other business services 
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o Other business services, miscellaneous business, professional, 
technical services 
- Personal, cultural, recreational services 
- Government services not elsewhere included 
Other items:  
- Trade in goods 
- Migrants’ transfers 
- FDI 
 
Country groups  
The country classification used in the analysis builds on the World 
Bank’s income classification as of 2009 (see 
 http://go.worldbank.org/D7SN0B8YU0). The LDCs and the EU27 
are grouped separately so the classification looks as follows:  
- Least Developed Countries (LDC): After Cape Verde graduated in 
2007 there are 49 countries classified by the UN (ECOSOC) as 
LDCs. The LDCs belong to different income groups: 35 are low-
income, 12 are lower middle income (Angola, Bhutan, Djibouti 
Kiribati, Lesotho, Maldives, Sudan, Solomon Islands, São Tomé 
and Principe, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu, Samoa) and one is high-
income (Equatorial Guinea). Tuvalu is not on the World Bank in-
come classification list but can probably be considered as lower 
middle income. 
- EU: The 27 EU countries are classified in different World Bank 
categories (High-income OECD, High-income non-OECD and 
Upper middle income) but we prefer to show the EU as a distinct 
group. 
- Other low and lower middle income (LLM): There are eight low-
income countries that are not LDC (Ghana, Kenya, Kyrgyz Re-
public, Korea, Dem. Rep., Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and 
Zimbabwe) and 43 lower middle income countries (including large 
countries such as China, India and Indonesia). 
- Upper middle income (UM): There are 46 countries in the World 
Bank’s upper middle income category but five are EU members 
and included in EU-27 in our classification. Hence 41 countries 
remain in this group, including countries such as Russia, South Af-
rica and Turkey. 
- Other high-income (High): This group includes 43 countries, e.g. 
the USA, Japan, Korea, non-EU countries in Western Europe.  
In order to see which individual countries are in each group, the 
World Bank link above may be consulted. 
 
Balassa indexes  
These are simple indexes of the form 
Where x=exports and m=imports. This varies between -1 (only im-
ports) and +1 (only exports).   
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Sector: Services total 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data: 137-147 (28-31) 
 
Shares of world exports 1990-2007
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Sector: Transport services 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data: 137-147 (28-31) 
Shares of world exports 1990-2007
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Sector: Passenger transport services 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data: 88-91 (10-12) 
Shares of world exports 1993-2007
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Sector: Transport freight services 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  118-126 (20-24) 
Shares of world exports
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Sector: Travel services 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  133-142 (24-28) 
Shares of world exports
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Sector: Communication services 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data: 129-140 (22-26) 
Shares of world exports
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Sector: Construction services 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  66-88 (9-13) 
Shares of world exports
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
Sh
ar
e 
in
 %
 o
f s
am
pl
e 
to
ta
l
LDC
LLM
UM
High
EU
 
LDC share of world exports and imports
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
%
 o
f w
or
ld
/ s
am
pl
e 
to
ta
l
Imports
Exports
 
Balassa specialisation indexes for main country groups
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
In
de
x 
(b
et
w
ee
n 
-1
 a
nd
 +
1)
EU
High
UM
LLM
LDC
Service and Development: The Scope for Special and Differential Treatment in the GATS  
 
123
Sector: Insurance 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  100-103 (12-16) 
Shares of world exports 
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Sector: Financial services 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  105-112 (16-18) 
Shares of world exports 
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Sector: Computer services 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  96-104 (10-14) 
Shares of world exports
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126 
Sector: Royalties, license fees etc. 
Note: Exports = received. 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data: 91-100 (10-16). 
Shares of world exports
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Sector: Other business services 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  125-130 (21-25) 
Shares of world exports
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Sector: Other miscellaneous business,  
professional, technical services 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  98-123 (16-22) 
Shares of world exports
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Sector: Personal, cultural, recreational  
services etc. 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data: 83-95 (9-13) 
Shares of world exports
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Sector: Government services n.i.e. 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  117-124 (23-25). 
Shares of world exports
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Sector: Trade in goods 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  137-147 (28-31) 
Shares of world exports
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Item: Migrants’ transfers 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  44-54 (2-3) 
Note: Exports=received. 
Note: Limited observations for LDCs: Fluctuations partly due to 
changes in the number of observations. 
Shares of world exports
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Item: FDI 
Number of countries (LDCs) covered by data:  80-90 (5-6) 
Shares of outward FDI
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Classification of services 
 
The following is downloaded from www.imf.org and describes the 
classification of some relevant sub-items: 
 
“158. Transportation covers most of the services, performed by 
residents for non-residents and vice versa, that were included in 
shipment and other transportation in the fourth edition of the 
Manual. However, freight insurance is now included with insurance 
services rather than with transportation. Transportation includes 
freight and passenger transportation by all modes of transporta-
tion and other distributive and auxiliary services, including rentals 
of transportation equipment with crew. Certain exceptions are 
noted in chapters X, XI, and XIII.  
159. Travel covers goods and services—including those related 
to health and education—acquired from an economy by non-
resident travellers (including excursionists) for business purposes 
and personal use during their visits (of less than one year) in that 
economy. Travel excludes international passenger services, which 
are included in transportation. Students and medical patients are 
treated as travellers, regardless of their length of stay. Certain 
others—military and embassy personnel and non-resident work-
ers—are not regarded as travellers. However, expenditures by 
non-resident workers are included in travel, while those of military 
and embassy personnel are included in government services, 
n.i.e. These cases are noted in chapters XII and XIII.  
160. Communications services cover communications transac-
tions between residents and non-residents. Such services com-
prise postal, courier, and telecommunications services (transmis-
sion of sound, images, and other information by various modes 
and associated maintenance provided by/for residents by/for non-
residents).  
161. Construction services cover construction and installation 
project work that is, on a temporary basis, performed abroad/in 
the compiling economy or in extraterritorial enclaves by resi-
dent/non-resident enterprises and their personnel. Such work 
does not include that undertaken by a foreign affiliate of a resi-
dent enterprise or by an unincorporated site office that, if it meets 
certain criteria, is equivalent to a foreign affiliate. Such residency 
aspects are covered in chapters IV and XIII.  
162. Insurance services cover the provision of insurance to non-
residents by resident insurance enterprises and vice versa. This 
item comprises services provided for freight insurance (on goods 
exported and imported), services provided for other types of di-
rect insurance (including life and non-life), and services provided 
for reinsurance. (For the method of calculating the value of insur-
ance services, see paragraphs 256 and 257.)  
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163. Financial services (other than those related to insurance 
enterprises and pension funds) cover financial intermediation ser-
vices and auxiliary services conducted between residents and non-
residents. Included are commissions and fees for letters of credit, 
lines of credit, financial leasing services, foreign exchange trans-
actions, consumer and business credit services, brokerage ser-
vices, underwriting services, arrangements for various forms of 
hedging instruments, etc. Auxiliary services include financial mar-
ket operational and regulatory services, security custody services, 
etc.  
164. Computer and information services cover resident/ non-
resident transactions related to hardware consultancy, software 
implementation, information services (data processing, database, 
news agency), and maintenance and repair of computers and re-
lated equipment.  
165. Royalties and license fees cover receipts (exports) and 
payments (imports) of residents and non-residents for: (i) the au-
thorized use of intangible nonproduced, nonfinancial assets and 
proprietary rights such as trademarks, copyrights, patents, proc-
esses, techniques, designs, manufacturing rights, franchises, etc. 
and (ii) the use, through licensing agreements, of produced origi-
nals or prototypes, such as manuscripts, films, etc.  
166. Other business services provided by residents to non-
residents and vice versa cover merchanting and other trade-
related services; operational leasing services; and miscellaneous 
business, professional, and technical services. (See the table on 
Selected Supplementary Information following this chapter and 
paragraphs 261 through 264 for details.)  
167. Personal, cultural, and recreational services cover (i) audio-
visual and related services and (ii) other cultural services provided 
by residents to non-residents and vice versa. Included under (i) 
are services associated with the production of motion pictures on 
films or video tape, radio and television programs, and musical 
recordings. (Examples of these services are rentals and fees re-
ceived by actors, producers, etc. for productions and for distribu-
tion rights sold to the media.) Included under (ii) are other per-
sonal, cultural, and recreational services, such as those associated 
with libraries, museums, and other cultural and sporting activities.  
168. Government services, n.i.e. cover all services (such as ex-
penditures of embassies and consulates) associated with govern-
ment sectors or international and regional organizations and not 
classified under other items.”  
 
